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The conceptual divide between “hard power” and “soft power,” and the resources 
that constitute the basis of each, remain hotly debated topics among International 
Relations theorists as well as foreign policy advisors and analysts.  Two developments in 
the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the hard-power/soft-power 
dichotomy are: (1) the pursuit by many single-state actors of foreign policy strategies 
identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments, and (2) the realization by 
political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and 
soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and 
soft power acting hard.  Exploring this dichotomy further, I examine the Russian 
Federation’s use of its hard and soft power with respect to the de facto independent 
Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia from 1999-2009 by identifying specific Russian 
foreign policy instruments employed in the bilateral relationship and analyzing how these 
instruments draw upon and project Russian hard and soft power.  My findings support 
research addressing instances when traditionally defined hard-power instruments display 
 vii 
soft-power effects, and vice versa, and highlight examples of individual policy 
instruments producing both hard and soft-power effects simultaneously; coercing a 
subject while they co-opt its interests.  In addition, I find that the Russian Federation is 
actively employing soft-power methods of engagement in its contemporary foreign policy 
strategy, having substantially increased this employment between 1999-2009—
particularly with respect to Abkhazia.  Concerning the Russia-Abkhazia relationship 
specifically, I conclude that, based on Russia’s engagement of the region from 1999-
2009, ties between the country and the de facto state will continue to strengthen, 
however, with Abkhazia in an increasingly supplicant position. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
A QUESTION OF DIVIDED POWER 
The conceptual divide between “hard power” and “soft power,” and the resources 
that constitute the basis of each, became the focus of multiple political theorists during 
the last two decades of the twentieth century.  Broadly defined, the use of hard power is 
accomplished through instruments of coercion, emphasizing inducement or threat, while 
the use of soft power emphasizes co-optation through attraction and persuasion.  When 
applied, hard power is used to coerce the subject into acting in a desired way, while soft 
power is used to convince the subject that it actually wants to act in a desired way. 
A definition of power possessing dimensions other than military prowess and 
economic dominance has existed in the modern political science literature since the 
1950s,1 and strategies of cultural co-optation are by no means new phenomena in 
international politics.  However, for the first time in the 1990s, a group of political 
scientists led by Joseph Nye Jr. began theoretically to divide foreign policy strategies 
along hard-power and soft-power lines.  By and large their goal was to simplify the 
analysis of contemporary foreign policy, while at the same time focusing on forms of 
influence not based in a country’s military and economic resources.  It turn, they claimed 
this dichotomy would assist analysts in evaluating the effectiveness of differing 
approaches to interstate relations.  Could different approaches, based more on hard power 
or soft power, yield distinctive results in similar situations?  Were there instances when 
one approach would produce a more favorable outcome than another?  Today, the 
theoretical divide between hard power and soft power—and the unique utility of each—
                                                 
1 In his 1954 Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau forwarded a definition of power encompassing 
elements of culture and political ideology in addition to military and economic resources (see Chapter Two, 
footnote 12, at p. 17). 
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remains a hotly debated topic among political theorists as well as foreign policy advisors 
and analysts, and it demands further examination theoretically and empirically. 
Two developments in the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the 
hard-power/soft-power dichotomy are: (1) the pursuit by many single-state actors of 
foreign policy strategies identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments 
(Ding and Saunders 2006; Oguzlu 2007; Wu 2007; Altunisik 2008; Sun 2008; Nye and 
Jisi 2009; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2010) and, more recently, (2) the realization by 
political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and 
soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and 
soft power acting hard (Tsygankov 2006(a); Lebow 2007; Lukes 2007; Maliukevicius 
2007; Mattern 2007).  Conforming to what might be termed the “realist tradition,”2 large 
single-state actors have typically focused their foreign policy strategies on hard power-
laden methods of coercion, including military interventions, security treaties, economic 
sanctions and international investment (Berenskoetter 2007; Schmidt 2007; Wagner 
2009).  Recently, however, as international norms decrying coercion continue to solidify, 
and as an increasing amount of rhetoric continues to prop up strategies intended to “win 
the hearts and minds” of other nations, many observers have marked a shift in the foreign 
policy focus of numerous powerful states toward a strategy that incorporates soft power 
resources to a greater degree (Tsygankov 2006(a); Popescu 2006(b); Wu 2007; Oguzlu 
2007; Altunisik 2008; Nye and Jisi 2009). 
In many cases these theorists and policy analysts claim that the practical—read 
economically inexpensive—and normative implications of the divide between coercive 
and persuasive methods of engagement—as well as questions about the differing 
                                                 
2 For a concise overview of the concept of Power in Realist theory, see Brian Schmidt’s “Realist 
Conceptions of Power” (Schmidt 2007).   
 3 
strategies’ utility and effectiveness—are beginning to dominate the international agenda, 
and are becoming increasingly important factors affecting the domestic and foreign 
policy decisions of individual states.  Considering the subject’s growing importance and 
relevance within the academic and policy communities, an increased understanding of 
how single-state actors are blending their hard and soft power is essential for a broader 
understanding of contemporary international politics.  In order to understand this 
blending of power, however, it is necessary to know when individual policy instruments 
are drawing upon hard-power, soft-power or a combination of both types of resources. 
Emanating largely from criticism of Nye’s original theory,3 the realization that 
individual policy instruments drawing upon traditionally defined hard-power resources 
may also exhibit soft-power effects, and vice versa, has opened numerous channels for 
further research into the varying ways in which hard-power and soft-power resources 
complement and contradict each other in actual policy formation.  In his 2007 article 
“Notes on a soft-power research agenda,” Nye outlines three areas where such research is 
needed.  First, citing Walter Russell Mead, Nye acknowledges that economic power can 
be a source of attraction as well as coercion.  “Economic power is sticky power; it 
seduces as much as it compels…A set of economic institutions and policies…attracts 
others into our system and makes it hard for them to leave” (Nye 2007, 165).  Even so, 
Nye admits that it is often quite difficult at first glance to determine what power 
resources any given policy instrument is drawn from, and what effects, hard or soft, it 
may have.  “In real world cases,” he explains, “hard and soft power are often mixed.”  In 
                                                 
3 In his 1991 Bound to Lead, Nye subdivides power, which he describes as “the ability to get others to do 
what they otherwise would not do,” into “command power” and “co-optive power,” the former prosecuted 
through strategies using inducements and threats (carrots and sticks) and the latter through strategies 
emphasizing the “attraction of one’s ideas [or] the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the 
preferences that others express.”  He associates what he calls “hard power resources” like military and 
economic strength with command power, and he associates “soft power resources” like culture, ideology, 
institutions and norms with co-optive power (Nye 1991, 31-34). 
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this vein, Nye calls for further investigation into the “complex manner in which economic 
resources produce a mix of hard- and soft-power behavior” (Nye 2007, 165). 
Second, Nye addresses the burgeoning scholarship concerning the relationship 
between traditionally hard-power military resources and the application of soft power.  
Calling for more research, Nye highlights examples of military instruments that might 
attract governments and peoples without coercion, including well-run military campaigns, 
myths of military invincibility and humanitarian missions.  Finally, in response to Janice 
Bially Mattern and Steven Lukes’s claims that soft power is blatantly coercive, especially 
when it takes the form of indoctrination and propaganda (Lukes 2007; Mattern 2007), 
Nye calls for more empirical research investigating the dichotomy between 
“indoctrination and the exercise of power that leaves those subject to it free to live 
according to the dictates of their nature and judgment” (Nye 2007, 169). 
RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA 
Touching on tenets of the three research avenues identified above, I examine the 
Russian Federation’s blending of its hard and soft power resources in its evolving 
engagement of, and relationship with, the de facto independent, Georgian separatist 
region of Abkhazia during the period 1999-2009.  The decision to focus on the period 
beginning with Vladimir Putin’s ascendance reflects considerations of the evolution of 
Russia’s political system from the conflicting and ad hoc regional policies of the Yeltsin 
administrations to the more centralized and consistent policies of the Putin and Medvedev 
administrations, especially with respect to Abkhazia.  In addition, by choosing to 
examine this period, I am also taking into account the Abkhazian political cycle, 
beginning with the 1999 referendum on Abkhazian independence from Georgia and 
ending with the third Abkhazian presidential elections in 2009. 
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In the Russia-Abkhazia relationship we find the compelling case of a powerful 
single-state actor experimenting in the process of solidifying a stable and consistent 
foreign policy strategy, while engaging a de facto state in a geopolitically vital region 
where the former perceives its military, economic and cultural influence as on the 
decline.  Additional issues concerning ethno-nationalism, unrecognized independence, 
“frozen conflicts” and peacekeeping regimes give the case a unique ability to illustrate 
the specifics of the Russian hard power/soft power foreign policy blend.4 
Having assumed its current borders and governing constitution only in the early 
1990s, Russia is a relatively young state that is still in the process of developing durable 
international ties, and solidifying a grand foreign policy strategy.5  Importantly, the 
dynamics of Russia’s developing strategy display the process of policy experimentation, 
evidenced by Moscow’s frequently ad hoc engagement over the last decade of the states 
that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.6  The results of this experimentation 
have the potential to reveal much about individual policy utility and Moscow’s 
preferences in its engagement strategy, which connects directly to questions concerning 
the changing balance of hard and soft power projected by Russia. 
With existing cultural, linguistic, historical, economic and frequently religious ties 
held over from the Soviet period, Russia’s relationship with the former Soviet 
republics—especially those within the Caucasus and Central Asia—further justifies the 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that any “foreign policy blend” is not necessarily intentional as the effects of certain 
policies can be miscalculated or alternatively can react with other policies in unexpected ways. This will be 
expanded upon in later chapters. 
5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian President approved and published three evolving Foreign 
Policy Concepts in 1993, 2000 and 2008. 
6 Examples of this ad hoc engagement have included a proposed unification treaty with Belarus, punitive 
oil and natural gas pricing and supply policies with Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia, trade embargos with 
Moldova and Georgia, monopolistic energy contracts with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and varying 
restrictive and non-restrictive visa regimes with neighboring states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
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choice of the Russia-Abkhazia relationship as a case study.  Despite the occasional claims 
that Russian influence—military, economic and cultural—may be waning in the former 
Soviet space (Menon and Motyl 2006), Russia remains integrally connected to each of 
the former Soviet states and levees more influence on them than any other single state or 
organization.  Furthermore, Russia’s repeated affirmations that Central Asia and the 
Caucasus lie solely within its political and cultural “spheres of influence” ensure that 
Moscow will continue to pursue policies intended to expand and solidify Russian 
dominance in these regions.7  In addition, Moscow arguably prosecutes its purist form of 
foreign policy with respect to the former Soviet republics, in so far as there is 
comparatively little pressure from the international community to apply certain policies 
or adhere to particular norms within the region.8  This again gives Russia room for policy 
experimentation.  Moreover, because of its already existing cultural, linguistic and 
political ties to the region, Russian soft power will likely be most visible in its 
relationships with the former Soviet states, making it an ideal setting in which to view 
Russia’s blending of hard and soft power. 
In addition to the regional considerations discussed above, the choice to focus on 
Russia’s relationship with Abkhazia reflects local considerations of competing ethnic 
                                                 
7 Although he downplayed the idea that Russia was attempting to “subjugate the former Soviet space,” in 
2004 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov asserted, “From the point of view of security, our closest 
neighbors, the countries of the CIS, are of crucial importance for us.” This came on the heels of a previous 
statement at a 2003 press conference where Ivanov tellingly stated that Russia reserved the right to 
intervene militarily in CIS countries in order to resolve disruptions or disputes that could not be settled by 
negotiation (Grachev 2005, 264).  In September 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated this point 
referring to the Caucasus and Central Asia as “regions in which Russia has privilege interests” (quoted in 
Allison 2008, 1167).  
8 One example of this is seen in the free hand that Russian peacekeepers (CISPFK) possess in the 
Caucasus.  Despite reports of smuggling and other criminal activities perpetrated by Russian peacekeeping 
forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Mirimanova and Klein 2005), as well as repeated complaints by the 
Georgian government concerning the conduct of the CISPFK within Georgia’s internationally-recognized 
borders, calls to internationalize the UN-sponsored peacekeeping force have been ignored by the 
international community and the Russian CISPFK mandate in the conflict zones remained unchanged and 
unmodified from 1994-2008 (Antonenko 2005; IIFFMCG 2009(a)). 
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identities and ethno-nationalism movements, an over fourteen-year military peacekeeping 
presence in a de facto state, and Abkhazia’s autonomy as a point of contention in the 
larger Russia-Georgia relationship.  These unique factors have been a driving force 
behind Russia’s developing relationship with the secessionist republic, and Moscow has 
had an incentive to use all the methods and resources at its disposal to foster this 
relationship 
MODEL 
Through the paradigm of hard and soft power grounded in Joseph Nye’s theories, 
the present work centers on two primary research questions in its analysis of the Russia-
Abkhazia relationship: 
1. What specific foreign policy instruments did Russia employ in its engagement of 
Abkhazia during the period examined (1999-2009)? 
2. Within these instruments, how did Russia utilize and blend its hard-power and 
soft-power resources? 
Theoretical evaluation grounded in Nye’s theories can reveal much in terms of 
each policy instrument’s hard and/or soft-power resource origins and probable method of 
altering subject behavior.  However, theoretical evaluation can often have unclear or 
contradicting implications, especially when instruments exhibit both hard and soft-power 
origins that may affect the subject in contradicting ways.  Especially considering the 
theoretical pitfalls of the exercise and vehicle fallacies9 as discussed by Steven Lukes, 
and taking into account the role subject-interests play in the interpretation and effects of 
                                                 
9 The exercise fallacy refers to the assumption that power is “the causing of an observable sequence of 
events.”  Steven Lukes argues this has led many to “equate power with success in decision-making” and 
“prevailing over others in conflict situations.”  In this sense, power becomes mistakenly defined as the 
outcome of its own application.  Alternatively, the vehicle fallacy refers to the assumption that power is 
defined by the resources from which it emanates, leading many to mistakenly “equate power with power 
resources,” such as “wealth, status…military forces and weaponry.” (Lukes 2007) 
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policy instruments, any analysis of Russian hard and soft power with respect to Abkhazia 
necessarily requires a theoretical evaluation of individual Russian policy instruments as 
well as an empirical evaluation of their interpretation by the Abkhazian subjects.  As 
such, analysis of how Russian policies project Russian hard and soft power must be 
approached from two separate angles: how Russian policies project hard and soft power 
in theory and how they project hard and soft power in practice. Secondary research 
questions to be addressed in instrument evaluation and analysis include: 
3. To what extent can each policy instrument be theoretically defined as a projection 
of hard power, soft power or a combination of both? 
4. How does available empirical evidence support, refute or clarify each policy 
instrument’s theoretical evaluation? 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of my research are twofold: using the case study of the Russia-
Abkhazia relationship to inform hard and soft-power theories while simultaneously using 
those theories to inform the case, the present work looks (1) to expand upon the 
International Relations literature addressing the politics of contemporary Russia, the 
Caucasus region and the former Soviet Union, and (2) to further the research examining 
how hard and soft-power resources overlap and blend in actual policy formation. 
Topically, my research confronts issues concerning stability and territorial 
integrity in the Caucasus, broader policies of ethno-political self-determination, and the 
sometimes forceful and often-nuanced intervention strategies of the Russian Federation.  
A detailed and multifaceted understanding of these topics will assist both theorists and 
politicians as they explore the most effective strategies to counter threats to security in 
these regions, including ethno-political conflict, violations of the international 
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sovereignty of states, and the abuse of energy and information resources.  In addition, as 
an investigation into Russia’s use of its various capacities for influencing change, the 
present work expands the literature addressing contemporary Russian foreign policy, and 
how the latter views its ability to use both hard and soft power.  For these reasons, my 
research is especially vital to policy makers in the US, Europe and Eurasia who are 
looking for methods in which to engage the countries and peoples of Eurasia—especially 
in Russia and the Caucasus—while simultaneously confronting Moscow’s regional 
dominance.  Finally, as I am concentrating my work on the Russia-Abkhazia relationship, 
my project also addresses what the political future may hold for Abkhazia, a de facto 
independent region in Georgia and one of four “frozen conflicts” currently smoldering in 
the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. 
In terms of its contributions to the hard and soft power theoretical literature, the 
present work examines how individual policies, relying on various blends of hard and 
soft power resources, interplay with, reinforce and contradict each other, and how small 
states react to the various policies of larger states when they are delineated within the 
hard and soft power paradigm.  My research also addresses issues of policy formation by 
approaching the concept of “effective blends” of hard and soft power for large state 
actors who traditionally possess extensive hard power military and economic resources as 
well as soft power cultural resources.  “Effectiveness” in this context is a complicated 
concept, encompassing state goals, implementation methods and multi-party perceptions.  
However, identifying various hard and soft-power instruments applied by powerful state 
actors, and examining how they are applied and interpreted is an essential step in 
approaching this elusive concept, which future research can build upon.   Finally, my 
research promises to empirically confront inconsistencies and contradictions in the hard 
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and soft power literature in general, answering questions about when hard power is soft 
and soft power is hard. 
Following a review of the critical literature addressing the larger theories and 
criticisms of hard power and soft power in International Relations, I examine Russian 
hard and soft-power resources and foreign policy instruments, briefly discuss the history 
of the Russia-Abkhazia relationship and the motivations of the two sides, analyze the 
specific Russian policy instruments directed toward Abkhazia and analyze in depth two 
instances of engagement: (1) the granting of Russian passports to Abkhazian citizens and 
(2) Russian involvement in the 2004 Abkhazian elections.  I conclude with the theoretical 
and policy-oriented implications of my analyses and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2: On Power 
POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
Power—wielded by nation-states, multinational institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, broad-based political movements or other international actors—is one of 
the core concepts in the study of International Relations (IR).  Although the concept is 
central to the field, a consensus on exactly what power is, where it comes from, how it is 
used and who can use it is largely non-existent, and even within the various schools of 
thought, serious disagreements predominate.  Working in this context, in the introduction 
to his and M. J. Williams’s compilation Power in World Politics, Felix Berenskoetter 
reviews the theoretical study of power in IR. 
Beginning his discussion with the work of Max Weber—specifically the theorist’s 
definitions of Macht (power) and Herrschaft (typically translated as either authority, 
domination, rule or governance)10—Berenskoetter traces “three dimensions” of power 
found in political and social theory as they appear in IR.  These dimensions are associated 
respectively with the realist, institutionalist and constructivist schools of thought and are 
differentiated based on how power is identified, how it is measured and how it is used or, 
as Stefano Guzzini puts it, “what does power mean?” and “what does power do?” 
(Guzzini 2007). 
As Berenskoetter explains, realists have frequently equated power with 
capabilities, e.g., the capability to win wars, and assert that the concept must be measured 
in the resources that facilitate said capabilities, e.g., military might, economic weight, etc.  
                                                 
10 Weber defined Macht as the “opportunity to have one’s will prevail within a social relationship, also 
against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on” (Berenskoetter’s translation).  He 
conceptualized Herrschaft as “the opportunity to find obedience amongst specified persons for a given 
order” (Berenskoetter’s translation), where this obedience is based on a belief in legitimacy supported by 
either rational calculation, custom/habit or personal affection (Berenskoetter 2007, 3-4). 
 12 
The problems inherent with this narrow conception of power will be addressed below.  
Based on the work of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, the second dimension of power 
that Berenskoetter describes centers on what has become known as agenda setting.  
Essentially this is the ability of one actor to eliminate choices for its opponent or exclude 
issues from the debate, thereby setting the rules of the game and defining the setting in 
which any conflict between two actors takes place.  Finally, the third dimension of power 
discussed by Berenskoetter acknowledges that the use of power can be present even when 
conflict between two parties is replaced by consensus.  Built largely on the work of 
Steven Lukes, this third dimension of power is in play when the interests of one actor are 
fundamentally changed by a second actor so that they reflect the interests of that second 
actor, thus creating peaceful and natural consensus. 
Relevant to the three dimensions of power listed above is David Baldwin’s 
distinction between analytical approaches to the concept, i.e., “the elements of national 
power approach, which depicts power as resources, and the relational power approach, 
which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship” (quoted in Schmidt 2007, 47).  
Unsurprisingly, in the realm of IR, those belonging to the realist school of thought adhere 
to the former, while “liberals” in both the institutionalist and constructivist schools 
champion the latter. 
Realists applying the resource-centric approach define a nation’s power as 
equivalent to the sum of its economic, military and other (largely material) capabilities.  
Inherent in this approach is the assumption that a nation can and will levee these 
capabilities, when necessary, to achieve its goals.  In contrast, central to the relational 
conception of power in IR is a nation’s ability to effect change in the behavior of other 
nations. According to Robert Dahl, an influential proponent of the relational analytical 
approach, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
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would not otherwise do” (quoted in Schmidt 2007, 48).  Influence over the decision-
making processes is of considerably less theoretical importance to the realist school of 
thought. 
It is important to note that within the framework of the relational approach, the 
ability, for example, of “nation A” to influence “nation B” still emanates from the 
resources possessed by “nation A.” The distinction that separates the relational and 
resource-centric approaches lies in the emphasis.  Put simply, if realists equate power 
with resources, then institutionalists and constructivists equate it with outcomes.  As 
such, while those examining any given nation’s power potential writ large might benefit 
from defining the concept using a resource-centric approach, for those examining the 
influence of one particular nation over another, a relational approach would be the most 
appropriate analytical framework. 
The above approaches to analyzing power in IR can be problematic, however, as 
there exist several theoretical pitfalls that potentially threaten construct validity.  Steven 
Lukes addresses two such pitfalls in his 2007 article “Power and the battle for hearts and 
minds,” citing what Anthony Kenny termed “two different forms of reductionism, often 
combined and often confused, depending on whether the attempt was to reduce a power 
to its exercise or its vehicle” (Lukes 2007, 84).  These are the “exercise fallacy” and the 
“vehicle fallacy.”  The exercise fallacy refers to the assumption that power is “the 
causing of an observable sequence of events.”  According to Lukes, this has led many to 
“equate power with success in decision-making” and “prevailing over others in conflict 
situations.”  In this sense, it is argued, power becomes mistakenly defined as the outcome 
of its own application.  Alternatively, the vehicle fallacy refers to the assumption that 
power is defined by the resources from which it emanates.  According to Lukes, this 
assumption has led many mistakenly to “equate power with power resources,” such as 
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“wealth, status…military forces and weaponry.”  On the contrary, as many political 
scientists have repeatedly claimed, the simple possession of power resources does not 
alone guarantee a state’s ability to successfully convert these resources into desired 
outcomes.   
Considering these potential pitfalls, Lukes forwards a modified, and particularly 
appealing version of Locke’s definition of power, theoretically adhering to the relational 
approach.  Lukes claims, “having power is being able to make or to receive any change, 
or to resist it.”  The important implication of this definition—combating both the exercise 
and vehicle fallacies—is that “power [merely] identifies a capacity:  power is a 
potentiality, not an actuality—indeed, a potentiality that may never be actualized” (Lukes 
2007, 84).  Building on Lukes’s relational definition of power as capacity, in order to use 
power effectively to achieve a desired outcome, one must first successfully convert the 
resources from which this capacity emanates into instruments, and one must then use 
those instruments properly11 (Nye 1991; Nye 2004; Lukes 2007). 
SOFT POWER: A WESTERN TAKE 
The term “soft power” was originally coined by American political scientist 
Joseph Nye, Jr. in his 1991 Bound to Lead.  Nye then refined and famously applied the 
concept to the United States’ foreign policy strategy combating Global Terrorism in his 
2004 Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.  Associating the concept with 
the simple notions of attraction, persuasion and seduction, Nye described soft power as 
the capacity to obtain desired outcomes without the use of inducements or threats, which 
were delegated to the application of so called “hard power.”  In this relational power 
                                                 
11 Lukes notes that this can be accomplished through either action or inaction considering that policies of 
abstention or non-intervention still adhere to Locke’s definition of being able to “make or receive” change 
(Lukes 2007, 85). 
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paradigm, hard and soft-power resources are converted into policy instruments and 
implemented in order to affect the behavior of the subject at which they are aimed.  When 
applied, soft power works by co-opting rather than commanding.  Put another way, if 
instruments of hard power are used to coerce a subject into behaving in a certain way or 
into making a certain decision desired by the power possessor/wielder, then instruments 
of soft power are used to convince the subject that it wants to behave in that way or wants 
to make that decision of its own accord.  Thus, soft power relates directly to the “second” 
and “third dimensions” of power described by Berenskoetter and discussed above.  
Importantly, as Nye frequently explains, hard and soft power resources and instruments 
can either compliment each other or undermine each other and a “smart” balance or blend 
is key. 
In Soft Power, Nye approaches the concept of power instruments by constructing 
a continuum of representations of hard and soft power, progressing from “harder” policy 
instruments that elicit cooperation through coercion and inducement to the “softer” 
instruments that elicit cooperation through agenda setting and attraction.  On this 
continuum, Nye also places the various power resources individual countries typically 
have at their disposal, with force, sanctions, payments and bribes corresponding to 
instruments of hard power, and institutions, values, culture and political policies 
corresponding to instruments of soft power (Nye 2004, 8, 31). 
As discussed briefly above, a theoretical division of influence generated by either 
military and economic resources or by resources associated with attraction and prestige 
was not a novel concept in the early 1990s.  In his article “The power of persuasion,” 
Richard Lebow traces concepts connected to emotionally charged rhetoric and issues of 
legitimacy in argumentation back to Ancient Greek playwrights and philosophers.  
Addressing the familiar concepts of power and influence, Lebow highlights the ancient 
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dichotomy between arche and hegemonia, where the former is defined as “control,” 
founded on material capabilities and the physical power to overcome or subdue an 
adversary and sustained through displays of that power, while the latter is a form of 
legitimate authority associated with honor and office (Lebow 2007).  As a method of 
influence, arche is maintained through rewards and threats while hegemonia is 
maintained through the natural legitimacy awarded the possessor – a division very 
reminiscent of Nye’s hard-power/soft-power paradigm. 
Central to both arche and hegemonia is persuasion, but as Lebow explains, the 
Ancient Greeks further differentiated between “persuasion brought about by deceit 
(dolos), false logic, coercion and other forms of chicanery from that persuasion (peitho) 
achieved by holding out the prospect of building or strengthening friendships, common 
identities and mutually valued norms and practices” (Lebow 2007, 130).  How this 
dichotomy applies to Nye’s distinctions between hard and soft power will be discussed in 
the next section, addressing his critics. 
The foundations of much of Nye’s work can also be found in the modern political 
science literature dating back to the early 1950s. Hans Morgenthau, champion of classical 
realism, defined political power in his 1954 Politics Among Nations as “a psychological 
relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.  It gives the 
former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former 
exerts over the latter’s minds” (quoted in Schmidt 2007, 49).  He goes on to distinguish 
sharply between political power and the use of physical force, arguing that when overt 
physical violence is used to influence the behavior of another actor and achieve a 
particular outcome, the psychological aspect of that particular power arrangement is lost 
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(Schmidt 2007, 49).12  Similarly E. H. Carr wrote extensively in the 1960s on the ability 
of propaganda to shape the opinions and preferences of others,13 dividing the concept of 
power in IR into three categories: military power, economic power and power over 
opinion (Schmidt 2007, 50).  Finally, Steven Lukes’s pioneering of the “three dimensions 
of power” in his 1974 Power. A Radical View—described by Berenskoetter and discussed 
above—are directly echoed in the work of Nye, as the latter emphasizes agenda setting 
and the power to change the beliefs and desires of others, even co-opting for his own use 
Lukes’s term, “third dimension of power” (Lukes 2007, 90). 
This is not to say that Nye’s work brought nothing new to the debate. Quite the 
contrary.  Where as Carr differentiated what he called power over opinion from military 
and economic power, he rejected the notion that the former could be used without the 
latter two.  Carr refused to allow the possibility that these three categories of power could 
be disassociated.  In contrast, Nye emphasized the qualitative difference between the 
“faces of power,” arguing that soft power was both cheaper and frequently normatively 
superior to its hard counterpart, and that its use could reduce dependence on hard-power 
“carrots and sticks”: 
If I can attract you to want to do what I want you to do, then I do not have to force 
you to do what you do not want to do.  If a leader represents values that others 
want to follow, it will cost less to lead.  Soft power allows the leader to save on 
carrots and sticks (Nye 2008, 30). 
                                                 
12 Morgenthau further highlights the potential utility of this psychological dimension of power, claiming 
that “if one could imagine the culture and…political ideology…of State A conquering the minds of all the 
citizens and determining the policies of State B, State A would have won a more complete victory and 
would have found its supremacy on more stable grounds than any military conqueror or economic master.  
State A would not need to threaten or employ military force or use economic pressure in order to achieve 
its ends; for that end, the subservience of State B to its will, would have already been realized by the 
persuasiveness of a superior culture and a more attractive political philosophy” (quoted in Ding and 
Saunders 2006, 8-9). 
13 Nye’s take on the influence of propaganda is discussed below. 
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Nye also emphasized the influence of a positive national image, formed by 
applying a nation’s soft-power resources, namely that nation’s openness and cooperation 
in the international arena and its culture and political institutions domestically.14  As 
explained by Giulio Gallarotti, such an image generates influence through respect and 
emulation, the former because others are more likely to defer to a nation garnering said 
respect, and the latter by creating behavioral continuity (Gallarotti 2007). 
Some of Nye’s greatest contributions center on his analysis of how hard and soft 
power are—and normatively should be—used in concert.  As noted above, Nye 
highlights the fact that hard power and soft power often reinforce, and just as frequently, 
interfere with each other, but emphasizes that neither alone is sufficient to effect real 
change in the modern world.15  He argues that a successful leader must be able to 
combine strategies projecting hard and soft power, finding a balance preventing either 
from drastically undercutting the other.  Nye dubs this balance “smart power” (Nye 
2008). 
SOFT POWER: A RUSSIAN TAKE 
In recent years, a growing number of Russian political scientists and foreign 
policy experts have themselves begun to champion soft power, emphasizing the novelty 
of the concept and its utility in constructing an influential foreign policy for the Russian 
Federation.  From a theoretical standpoint, these experts and scholars adhere for the most 
part to Nye’s hard-power/soft-power dichotomy, highlighting the latter’s focus on 
                                                 
14 In Notes on a soft-power research agenda, Nye quotes himself, reiterating that the “soft power of a 
country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political 
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority)” (quoted in Nye 2007, 164). 
15 Giulio Gallarotti builds on this argument in his “Power of Balance: Cosmopolitik and Security through 
Soft Power,” where he outlines the potential hazards of relying on hard power alone, what he refers to as 
“power illusion” (Gallarotti 2007, 43-49). 
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attraction and agenda setting based on a country’s culture, political ideals and foreign 
policies, as well as emphasizing the benefits of using both hard and soft power in concert 
(Казанцев и Меркушев 2008; Соловьев 2009; Наумов 2010). 
Building on the work of Nye, the Russian scholarship addressing soft power 
focuses much of its attention on national image formation.  In their 2008 article “Russia 
and the Post Soviet Space: perspectives for the use of ‘soft power,’”16 Kazantsev and 
Merkushev conceptualize the soft power of an attractive national image as a combination 
of that country’s “image,” “brand” and “reputation”17—aspects of a country’s outward 
identity meticulously crafted by politicians and elites to emphasize and deemphasize 
respectively existing positive and negative (i.e., attractive and unattractive) national 
stereotypes.  Importantly, the authors note that a national image “can differ quite 
substantially from reality,” becoming either more or less attractive than it would naturally 
be if it reflected objective facts.  Accordingly these authors emphasize how misleading a 
target audience with respect to a national image can be a valuable foreign policy tool 
(Казанцев и Меркушев 2008, 4).   
Interestingly, in an earlier and more extensive analysis18 of Russian national 
image formation with respect to the post-Soviet states, Kazantsev, Merkushev and their 
colleagues from Moscow State University and the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations expand on the concept of information manipulation19 and propaganda as viable 
                                                 
16 “Россия и постсоветское пространство: перспективы использования «мягкой силы»” (Казанцев и 
Меркушев 2008). 
17 Taken from the modern social science and business discourses, Kazantsev and Merkushev use the terms 
“имидж,” “бренд” and “репутация.”  
18 “Механизмы формироания позитивного образа России в странах постсоветского пространства” 
(Беспалов et al. 2007, 32). 
19 Building on A. I. Solovev’s definition of manipulation as a “type of covert informing or programming 
directed at a recipient and constructed to cause the latter to ignore his own will,” Bespalov et al. refine the 
concept as a “covert acting on individual or mass consciousness via communicative systems (interpersonal 
communication, education, mass media, internet) which ensures control of that subject (people, groups, an 
entire country) (author’s translations) (Беспалов et al. 2007, 32). 
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soft-power tools and strategies (Беспалов et al. 2007).  So-called “technologies of 
political manipulation” insert fabricated ideas framed as objective truth into mass 
consciousness, play on the fears and weaknesses of said masses, and couch policy 
successes in terms of public support for the (covert) goals of the power wielder.  On an 
international level, they argue, political manipulation presents itself as the influence of 
one subject over another, the result of which paradoxically leading to a convergence of 
national interests and varying degrees of consensus between the subjects.20  As such, the 
“psychological” or “information war” that results from the clashing of these 
technologies—replete with propaganda, lies and subliminal manipulation—is nonetheless 
characterized by these authors as occurring entirely within the realm of soft power.  This 
classification, namely that manipulative propaganda is also soft power (an argument 
present in the English-language scholarship as well), has raised a great deal of conceptual 
criticism in the field. 
CRITICISMS, CONTRADICTIONS AND MODIFICATIONS 
Considering the theoretical infighting surrounding the contested concept of power 
in IR, it is not surprising that Nye’s relatively simple hard/soft dichotomy has met with 
almost as much criticism as praise.  As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, one of 
the main thrusts of this criticism, highlighting contradictions and spurring modifications 
by critics, adherents and Nye himself, has been the realization that individual policy 
instruments drawing upon traditionally-defined hard-power resources may exhibit 
sometimes unexpected soft-power effects, and vice versa.  Put another way, hard power 
can occasionally act soft and soft power, occasionally hard.  Particularly problematic for 
many critics has been the classification of propaganda, manipulation and indoctrination 
                                                 
20 This agrees with Lukes “third dimension of power” and Nye’s soft power of a positive national image. 
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as soft-power instruments since they do not induce or threaten subjects using military and 
economic resources.   
In “Power and the battle for hearts and minds,” Steven Lukes devotes much of his 
attention to indoctrination as a method of inducing acquiescence.  Highlighting the 
routine “brainwashing” committed by the Wahhabist sect of Islam and emphasizing 
various instances of “indoctrination” worldwide, “communicating racist, sexist and other 
stereotypes and shaping agendas, national and international,” Lukes outlines two 
distinctions that he feels are quintessential to an accurate understanding of how power 
works in the modern international context.  The first of these distinctions is reflected in 
Nye’s and his own work concerning the various “faces” or “dimensions” of power, i.e., 
the difference between changing, by coercion or threat, the incentive structures of agents 
on the one hand (hard power), and influencing or shaping these structures on the other 
(soft power) (Lukes 2007, 94-95).  Lukes’s second distinction, which he claims has been 
“blurred” by Nye, emphasizes the difference between the “conditions under which and 
mechanisms by which such influencing or ‘shaping’ occurs, which may or may not favor 
‘personal reasoning’ and rational judgment” (Lukes 2007, 95).  Put simply, Lukes 
criticizes Nye for not distinguishing between instances when the so-called soft power of 
one actor results in the empowerment or the disempowerment of a second actor.   
According to Lukes, the latter, an effect of indoctrination, should not be considered an 
effect of “soft” power at all. 
Janice Bially Mattern even more vehemently criticizes Nye’s original dichotomy 
in her “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft.”  Modeling attraction as a sociolinguistic 
construction of “reality” produced through communicative exchange, Mattern simplifies 
one actor’s pursuit of attracting another down to a choice between communicative 
strategies that, based on the context of the interaction, are used to create the “reality” of 
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attraction between the two.  Although she acknowledges that different strategies can be 
more and less effective in different contexts,21 Mattern claims the only strategy that can 
be fully relied upon is one that utilizes representational force through “verbal fighting.”  
Put simply, verbal fighting looks to bully the subject into agreement by creating a 
narrative that threatens to destroy that subject’s “reality of self,” creating a non-choice 
through the use of propaganda and information control (Mattern 2007).  Primarily, this 
criticism applies to the agenda setting aspects of Nye’s definition. 
In his own discussion of leaders and followers in The Powers to Lead, Nye uses 
the example of Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China to discuss the 
control of information and more specifically propaganda, both of which he tellingly 
classifies as instruments projecting soft power.  The transfer of information, Nye argues, 
frequently takes the form of persuasion, and when that persuasion is emotionally charged, 
it becomes rhetoric, which, in its extreme, can become blurred with propaganda and 
indoctrination. As he explains, soft power is neither inherently good or bad—as a 
capacity for effecting change, it can be used for virtuous as well as nefarious purposes—
but the particularities of its application, i.e., its reliance on persuasion rather than 
coercion, allows for a certain amount of choice on the part of the party being impressed 
upon, something that the use of hard power eliminates (Nye 2008). 
However, Nye admits that an argument can be made for soft power acting 
coercively, in so far as it attempts to compel behavior.  Furthermore, he acknowledges 
that, although methods laden with soft power may preserve a nominal amount of choice, 
the level of this choice varies widely depending on the specific instruments employed.  
                                                 
21 Among these strategies, Mattern mentions persuasive arguing, bargaining, manipulation and seduction 
(Mattern 2007, 109). 
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Even some soft-power instruments, he explains, can have the effect of limiting individual 
or group autonomy through indoctrination, which can seem very coercive indeed: 
Persuasion has different degrees of emotional appeal, and an excessive rhetoric of 
group cohesion, patriotism, and collective identity is designed to drive out reason 
and limit individual autonomy.  Propaganda and ideology that approach 
brainwashing may so program followers that they are not even aware of the 
manipulation.  In such cases, soft power instruments can create a psychological 
manipulation that provides as little choice as hard power… (Nye 2008, 142) 
Importantly, at least one scholar has emphasized the potential danger of such soft-power 
policies.  If the information transferred is eventually discovered to be built on lies and 
manipulation, it will likely result in a backlash against the manipulating agent, ruining its 
reputation and in so doing seriously diminishing its soft power (Gallarotti 2007). 
THE APPLICATION OF THEORY 
When applied to real-world scenarios, striving to identify an elegant and clear 
theoretical distinction in which foreign policy instruments drawing on soft-power 
resources always act with soft-power effects, and vice versa, is both unrealistic and 
largely unnecessary.  Indeed military forces as well as economic institutions and 
processes can attract countries through the (re)definition of norms and (re)formation of 
interests, or coerce them through inducement and threat.  Likewise, when based on a 
foundation of deceit and manipulation, information resources, agenda setting strategies 
and the weaving of narratives can be said to coerce as opposed to attract.  Essential for 
political theorists and practitioners alike is the ability to identify and hopefully predict 
when various policy instruments will act in specific ways and how they will interact with 
each other when applied. This ability, in turn will give scholars and politicians the 
opportunity to form their own “smart power” balances.  Pursuant to this goal, I apply the 
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above theories in an analysis of Russian hard and soft power, examining how both have 
been used in the case of the Russia-Abkhazia relationship. 
A brief comment on preferences and agency needs to be made before we 
continue.  In their 2010 paper on the effects of foreign public opinion on US foreign 
policy,22 Goldsmith and Horiuchi outline a simple model for analyzing the short-term 
effects of soft-power policy instruments that can be modified to examine hard-power 
instruments as well.  The three essential elements to this model are (1) the message from 
a foreign country or power-wielding agent, (2) the political context of the message’s 
target, which determines how it is received, and (3) the salience of the issue(s) at stake 
for the target, which dictates if the target will react and to what extent.  It should be 
evident from this model that any analysis of a particular policy instrument from the 
standpoint of effectiveness necessitates an understanding of the power and interests 
possessed by the subject, whose preferences the power-wielding agent is attempting to 
influence.  Indeed, as it is this subject’s behavior that one is seeking to affect, how he 
interprets and reacts to the instrument applied, dictated by his preferences,23 determines 
whether the desired effect will be achieved. 
The issue of agency—both that of the power-wielder and the subject or target of 
the policy instrument wielded—further complicates analysis.  Basically, agency concerns 
revolve around the “Who’s” in the model above, i.e., who is sending a message by 
                                                 
22 “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for U.S. Foreign Policy?” (Goldsmith 
and Horiuchi 2010). 
23 According to Lukes, one way of conceiving an agent’s interests is by identifying them with his 
subjective preferences.  “Such preferences may…be ‘revealed’…in actual choice situations.  Call such 
preferences overt.  Alternatively they may be more or less hidden from view…they may take the form of 
half-articulated or unarticulated grievances or aspirations, which, because of the bias of the dominant 
political agenda or the prevailing culture, are not heard and may not even be voiced.  Call such preferences 
covert…to discover where people’s interests like, either you observe their choice behavior or else you infer, 
from a close observation of what they say and do, what they would choose were choices available which 
are currently unavailable” (Lukes 2007, 87-88). 
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wielding power? who is that message’s target? who is actually receiving and interpreting 
the message sent? for whom is the issue at stake salient? and finally, who is adjusting his 
behavior based on how he interprets that message?  It follows that any application of a 
model similar to the above necessitates a careful analysis of agency and subject 
preferences as it examines the interpretations and reactions of foreign policy targets. 
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Chapter 3: The Pillars of Russian Power 
RUSSIA RESURGENT? 
For much of the last decade, the combination of terms “Russia resurgent” was a 
ubiquitous occurrence in both the English-language media and policymaking 
communities.24  As with all political debates and postulates, however, there was naturally 
disagreement.  The perception of declining Russian influence, regionally and on a 
broader international level, became a catch phrase of its own following the so-called 
“color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005).  In their 
2007 American Interest article,25 Rajan Menon and Alexander Motyl cast doubt on the 
“myth of Russian resurgence,” highlighting the country’s week political institutions and 
President Vladimir Putin’s cronyism, the substantial decline in both size and quality of 
the Russian military machine since the Cold War, the instability of an economy built on 
energy resources alone, and the deplorable state of Russian “human capital,” i.e., a 
declining population, rampant alcohol abuse, the spread of AIDS and tuberculosis, etc. 
(Menon and Motyl 2007). 
Menon and Motyl’s arguments, however compelling, have not held up in the four 
years since their article’s publication.  More convincing are the majority of arguments in 
the scholarly and policymaking communities that paint a vivid picture of an autocratic, 
self-assertive, nay aggressive Russia, bent on regaining lost international influence and 
strength as a “revisionist” rather than “status quo” power in its near abroad as well as in 
Europe proper.  These same scholars and politicians further emphasize that Moscow is 
                                                 
24 Examples include the May 28, 2003 New York Times opinion piece “A Russia Resurgent;” the August 
18, 2007 Telegraph article “Russia Resurgent;” the August 14, 2008 Economist cover story “Russia 
resurgent;” and an entire subsection of the BBC Europe webpage, begun in 2007, entitled “Russia 
Resurgent.” 
25 “The Myth of Russian Resurgence” (Menon and Motyl 2007) 
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willing and able to use the myriad of resources and instruments at its disposal to realize 
this pursuit (Krastev 2005; Popescu 2006(a); Popescu 2006(b); Leonard and Popescu 
2007; Allison 2008; Blank 2008(a); Blank 2008(b)). 
THE PILLARS OF RUSSIAN POWER 
Building on Lukes’s modification of Locke, power, writ large, can be defined as a 
relational capacity to make, receive and resist change.  In the study of International 
Relations, as in all other contexts where the concept is discussed, the power of any actor 
is based on the resources from which that “capacity for change” emanates.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, while the vehicle fallacy rightly cautions us against measuring 
any actor’s power by merely computing his resource wealth, identification of the power 
resources that an actor possesses is essential to any measurement or evaluation of that 
actor’s power, since it is the conversion of these resources into policy instruments, and 
the application of these instruments that projects that power.   
In the international sphere, Russian power resources include its geographical size 
and location as the center of the post-Soviet area; its preponderance of energy resources 
and control of regional supply routes; its vast military-industrial and intelligence 
complexes; its numerous business interests and investment potential in neighboring 
countries; its vast labor market; its political stability and the ideology of “sovereign 
democracy”; its agenda-setting potential through international clout and membership in 
international organizations; its history of multiculturalism; the cultural appeal of its 
history and fine arts; its mass-media; and the status of the Russian language as the lingua 
franca throughout the former Soviet region (Popescu 2006(b); Leonard and Popescu 
2007; Kazantsev and Merkushev 2008; Goodrich and Zeihan 2009).  While the 
classification of Russia’s geographical size, energy reserves and military-industrial 
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complex as power resources is not surprising to any student of International Relations, 
the inclusion of what might be called “soft-power resources” to this list has been a source 
of controversy among Russia experts in a variety of fields. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, recent Russian-language publications 
addressing Moscow’s international influence and foreign policy direction have taken up 
the concept of soft power as a topic of considerable interest.  Almost unanimously these 
authors emphasize the potential gains to be made by incorporating soft power to a greater 
degree in Russia’s foreign policy strategy, disagreeing only on how feasible this endeavor 
is and how successfully Moscow has approached the task to date (Казанцев и Меркушев 
2008; Кондратенко 2009; Пронин 2009; Соловьев 2009; Наумов 2010):26 
For Russia, now more than ever before, it is vital to learn how to influence 
without brute force, to attract allies with soft-power approaches, to add to 
Russia’s military might and growing economic strength a betterment of its 
national image abroad (author’s translation Наумов 2009). 
The English-language literature addressing Russian soft power divides itself into 
two camps, the first of which heralding the increasing utility and use of co-optive 
strategies in Russian foreign policy.  Authors from this first group highlight Russian 
instruments that emphasize political legitimacy and economic interdependence, the 
exploitation of Diaspora influence and telecommunication networks, and an active 
support of Russian language and higher education facilities outside of Russian boarders 
(Popescu 2006(b); Tsygankov 2006(a); Ziegler 2006; Leonard and Popescu 2007).  In 
contrast, the opposing camp depicts a steady decline in effectiveness and frequency-of-
                                                 
26 Kazantsev and Merkushev and Pronin criticize Moscow’s application of its soft power, the former 
because the authors claim Russian elites are not adequately combating negative Russian stereotypes at 
home and abroad, while the latter claims that Russia currently does not possess the soft power 
infrastructure necessary to attract the attention of the influential Western intellectual class.  Solovev 
suggests that the utility of soft power has been underestimated by Moscow, and Naumov and Kondratenko 
call for increased investment into Russia’s soft-power potential, particularly in the humanitarian field. 
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use concerning these soft-power-oriented co-optation methods, emphasizing instead the 
resurgence of coercion in Russian foreign policy.  This latter group points to unattractive 
trends in the rise of domestic racism and violence, to ethnic Russian isolation and 
population depletion, and to a growing Russian ethnocentric orientation as indicators of 
the declining appeal of Russian civilization and culture to neighbors abroad (Menon and 
Motyl 2007; Shakleina 2007).  However, while such trends may appear to be harming 
Russian soft-power potential, they do not necessarily rule out its use.  Likewise, 
highlighting an increased use of hard-power instruments in Russian foreign policy does 
not preclude a similar increase in the use of soft-power instruments. 
Citing Joseph Nye, the authors that prop up the utility of soft power for Russia 
also emphasize the necessity of effectively combining both hard and soft-power 
instruments when engaging a fellow actor, be it an ally or an adversary.  As indicated 
previously, beyond merely quantifying and characterizing Russian hard and soft-power 
resources, identifying how those resources have been converted into policy instruments is 
critical when attempting to evaluate how Russia is choosing—consciously or 
subconsciously—to combine its hard and soft power.  Building on an analysis of Russia’s 
power resource base, it is possible to broadly classify major Russian foreign policy 
instruments as either “hard-power” or “soft-power” in character, depending on what type 
of resources they predominantly draw upon.  As previously noted, however, this type of 
characterization is incomplete as it only examines the source of the instruments’ capacity 
for influence and does not take into account how they are interpreted by the actor they are 
used against.  This critical detail will be addressed at length in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven where specific Russian policies with respect to Abkhazia are analyzed. 
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RUSSIAN HARD-POWER INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIES 
A nation’s hard power draws on its military and economic resources and, when 
implemented, is intended to coerce the subject at which it is aimed through threat or 
inducement respectively.  Russia’s hard-power resources center on its geography, 
military, energy supply and foreign investment capability.  In a 2009 report published by 
the private intelligence firm STRATFOR, Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan rebuff 
suggestions that amidst economic difficulties spurred by the global financial crisis, 
Russia’s ability to “project power abroad” has been substantially curtailed.  Focusing 
their analysis largely on Russia’s conversion of its hard-power resources, they highlight 
Moscow’s military modernization campaign and the use of force in the 2008 conflict with 
Georgia as foreign policy instruments projecting Russian hard power.  Security 
guarantees, weapons trade and military training provided by Russia to the other members 
of the CSTO27 are also among Moscow’s military hard-power instruments, intended to 
ensure continued cooperation concerning regional security (Соловьев 2009). 
Addressing the economic aspects of Russian hard power, experts devote a large 
portion of their analysis to Russia’s control of its energy resources.  As “carrots” intended 
to induce economic and political loyalty among neighbors, for many years Moscow 
provided oil and gas at subsidized prices to Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and 
has signed lucrative energy contracts with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
(Tsygankov 2006(b); Соловьев 2009).  As “sticks” used to threaten and even punish 
these same states during times of political and economic divergence, Moscow has moved 
to normalize energy prices with the former-Soviet states while simultaneously cutting off 
supply from time to time during periods of “crisis,” reminding its partners in the CIS and 
                                                 
27 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a military alliance founded in 2002.  Members 
include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan joined 
the alliance in 2006). 
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Western Europe who controls the spigots (Tsygankov 2006(b); Leonard and Popescu 
2007).  Robert Larsson from the Swedish Defense Research Agency identified 55 
separate instances of such energy cut-offs or threatened cut-offs by Russia from 1992-
2006. Larsson tellingly found that despite the claims of “technical problems” and 
industrial “accidents” offered as explanations for the cut-offs, the vast majority occurred 
during periods when Russia “wanted to achieve some political or economic objectives, 
such as influencing elections or obtaining control of energy infrastructure” within its 
neighboring states (Leonard and Popescu 2007, 22). 
In addition to the carrots and sticks associated with Russian oil and gas, Moscow 
has actively encouraged, if not individually spearheaded, substantial investment in 
Russia’s near abroad.  Eduard Solovev estimates that by 2008 Russian foreign direct 
investment in CIS states totaled seventy-two billion dollars (Соловьев 2009).  Occupying 
an advantaged position as the geographical center of the former Soviet Union, Russia also 
provides huge labor markets as well as transit and trade routes for its neighbors in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, and has unapologetically wielded restrictive visa regimes and 
trade embargos as political weapons during times of tension (Trenin 2006; Соловьев 
2009). 
RUSSIAN SOFT-POWER INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIES 
Much more difficult to measure, a nation’s soft power draws on three main 
resources – its culture, its political values and its foreign policies (Nye 2004).  Together 
these three resources create a national image, which if properly developed, will attract the 
subject at which it is aimed.  If this image is attractive enough, it is argued, it will elicit in 
the subject a respect for and a desire to emulate the country projecting the image, which 
in turn will cause political, economic, social or military alignment by setting the agenda 
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or co-opting the preferences of the subject themselves.  Interpretation of a national image 
is naturally highly subjective and soft-power policy instruments are used to meticulously 
craft that image based on the intended audience, frequently working to respectively 
reinforce and combat existing positive and negative national stereotypes. 
Essential to any understanding of Russian culture is an understanding of the 
nation’s history, literature, art, music and most importantly, language.  As the sixth most 
common language in the world with over 300 million speakers (half living outside the 
borders of the Russian federation) (Наумов 2009), the Russian language is an immense 
soft-power resource that Russia has done an expert job converting into active foreign 
policy instruments.  Founded in June 2007 by presidential decree, the Russian World 
Foundation was charged with the vital mission of supporting and exporting Russian 
language and culture.  Described as the “only fully formed element of soft power in 
modern Russia,” the Russian World Foundation was “given the task of upholding 
[Russia’s] prestige in the international arena and creating an environment in which people 
who did not previously feel any connection to the Russian-speaking world can now 
become an active part of it” (author’s translation Наумов 2009).  As a foreign policy 
tool the Russian World Foundation financially supports the teaching and study of the 
Russian language abroad, organizes local, national and international events, supports 
sister organizations in propagating Russian language and culture, sponsors grant 
competitions for university students and opens Russian cultural centers in countries all 
over the world.28   
Directly supporting the work of the Russian World Foundation is the Federal 
Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and 
                                                 
28 Фонд Русский Мир (официальный сайт), http://www.russkiymir.ru (accessed 8/9/11). 
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International Humanitarian Cooperation, known as Rossotrudnichestvo.29  Envisioned as 
a vital instrument for expanding the “cultural-humanitarian dimension of Russian foreign 
policy,” the agency tasks itself with the financial support of Russian compatriots abroad, 
the propagation of the Russian language and access to Russian education abroad, opening 
Russian-language schools and Russian-language centers around the world: 
Rossotrudnichestvo possesses all the prerequisites necessary to become a unique 
channel for the application of Russian soft power, to acquire the ability to 
influence Russia’s partner-countries and public opinion abroad, building on the 
attractiveness of our country from a civilization, humanitarian and foreign policy 
standpoint (author’s translation Россотрудничество 2009(a)). 
In terms of political values, Russia finds itself in direct competition with Western 
Europe and the USA.  In its simplest form the question of political values here is a 
question of political ideology after the end of the Cold War.  Soon after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, it became clear that, as Solovev put it, “everything that was connected 
with the ideas of freedom, democracy and liberalism was associated with the USA and 
other Western countries,” and “for post-communist Russia that kind of potential influence 
does not and will not ever exist” (author’s translation Соловьев 2009).  Russia had to 
create its own competing political ideology in order to salvage and develop its soft power 
in this area.  As Nye himself put it in 2009, “In today’s information age, success is the 
result not merely of whose army wins but also of whose story wins” (Nye 2009). 
Against the backdrop of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, the 
concept of a politically stable, centrally controlled “sovereign democracy” was born.  
Partially a response to Western criticism of Russia’s democratic institutions, “sovereign 
democracy” is based on the idea that Russia has its own unique set of democratic values 
that are distinct from their Western counterparts.  On paper Russia’s “sovereign 
                                                 
29 Россотрудничество (официальный сайт), http://rs.gov.ru/ (accessed 8/9/11). 
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democracy” is presented as an equivalent to Western democracy, but in reality it falls 
short in areas like the rule of law, protection of minorities, the free press, political 
opposition, etc.  Russian expert Nikolai Petrov called it “simply a new brand name for 
managed and centralized political development and can be considered to be the 
highest…stage of managed democracy” (quoted in Popescu 2006(b)).  To the fledgling 
autocratic regimes throughout the former Soviet Union, this new type of “democracy” 
had and has considerable appeal, and for Russia, the concept quickly became a 
potentially very valuable soft-power resource. 
The concept of “sovereign democracy” was refined and packaged for export, i.e., 
converted from power resource to policy instrument, by a group of political scientists and 
Kremlin insiders dubbed “political technologists:”30 
Russia’s new strategy [was]…based on exporting its own version of democracy 
and building pro-Russian constituencies in the post-Soviet societies. The major 
objective of this policy [was] to develop an efficient infrastructure of ideas, 
institutions, networks and media outlets that [could] use the predictable crisis of 
the current “orange-type” regimes to regain influence not simply at the level of 
government but at the level of society as well. Russia will not fight democracy in 
these countries. Russia will fight for democracy – its kind of democracy 
(emphasis added Krastev 2005). 
The soft-power infrastructure used in the export of this new ideology rests on a network 
of Kremlin-created and controlled “democratic” NGOs, the extensive state-owned 
Russian mass-media and the policy-making authority of the Presidential Department for 
Interregional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, created by presidential decree in 
2005 (Popescu 2006(b); Leonard and Popescu 2007; Krastev 2009).  When asked in a 
                                                 
30 According to Ivan Krastev, these political technologists “come from an intellectual milieu and the world 
of alternative culture…They are ultimately cynical but also highly inventive…They do not want to 
‘suppress democracy’ but simply play it around ‘using’ – and ‘abusing’ – it to serve their own purposes. 
They are anti-western westernizers, ex-liberals, anti-communists, liberal imperialists and true believers in 
the virtues and durability of managed democracy defined as a subtle combination of soft repression and 
hard manipulation” (Krastev 2005). 
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2005 interview how the head of the new department Modest Kolerov was intending to 
prevent revolutions from occurring in the CIS, he refused to answer, noting simply that 
his weapons would be “culture and spirituality” (Кашин 2005). 
Finally, Russian foreign policies are an important soft-power resource in so far as 
they project Russian culture and political values while conveying messages of support, 
cooperation and humanitarian concern on an international level, setting the political 
agenda for numerous nation-states, organizations and other international actors.  
Converted into policy instruments, the soft power of Russia’s foreign policies is projected 
through the decrees, statements and resolutions of the political institutions forming that 
foreign policy, namely the President of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia. 
TOWARD A RUSSIAN “SMART POWER” 
Discussed in Leonard and Popescu’s “Power Audit of EU-Russian Relations,” 
Moscow’s bilateral relationships with Greece and Cyprus are highlighted as instances 
where policymakers have taken the blending of hard and soft power in Russia’s foreign 
policy into earnest consideration.  For the purpose of creating so-called “Trojan horses” 
in the EU to “represent its positions and read from a Russian script,” Moscow has 
highlighted the “ancient cultural and more recent geopolitical and economic roots” of its 
connections with Greece and Cyprus. 
Politically, Russia has backed Greece in its dealings with Turkey and firmly 
supported the Cypriot position in the conflict over North Cyprus, protecting the island 
nation in international bodies such as the United Nations.  Economically, Russia partners 
with Athens in the energy sphere, cooperating in the construction of oil pipelines and 
supplying Greece with seventy-five percent of its gas needs, while in Cyprus Russian big 
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business has created numerous offshore firms that “invest” heavily in the Russian 
economy.  Russia has also been a substantial supplier of military equipment for Greece. 
By all accounts, Moscow has balanced its “smart power” with respect to Greece 
and Cyprus with expert efficiency, and it is reaping the benefits of its policy strategy: 
In exchange [for Moscow’s support], Greece has sought to position itself as a 
“promoter” of Russian positions within the EU on issues ranging from EU 
involvement in the Eastern neighborhood to the regulation of energy 
markets…[and] Cyprus has opposed proposals for energy unbundling and blocked 
proposals for increasing European involvement in the post-Soviet space (Leonard 
and Popescu 2007, 28, 30). 
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Chapter 4: Two Centuries of a United People 
My analysis of Russian hard and soft power used in its evolving engagement of 
Abkhazia covers the period 1999-2009 and, as briefly discussed above, reflects 
considerations of Russia’s centralized political system under Vladimir Putin and Dmitri 
Medvedev as well as the political cycles in the de facto state of Abkhazia.  Approaching 
this topic, however, it is necessary to first familiarize oneself broadly with the 200-year 
history of Russian-Abkhazian relations,31 as well as with Russian interests in Abkhazia 
and Abkhazian preferences regarding integration with the regional power. 
A CONCISE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN-ABKHAZIA RELATIONS 
Abkhazia was incorporated by charter into the Russian Empire by Tsar Alexander 
I in 1810.  Power struggles, peasant uprisings and Russian military intervention 
dominated much of the next century and resulted in the systematic deportation of much of 
the native ethnically Abkhaz population.  This history of course, runs counter to the 
official Russian point of view that 1810 witnessed the “voluntary unification of Abkhazia 
and Russia.”  Following Russia’s 1864 abolition of the autonomous Abkhazian 
princedom, two sentinel events, which to this day resound within the Abkhaz 
consciousness, took place: the 1867 and 1877 Abkhazian insurrections.  These uprisings 
were followed by the forced resettlement to Turkey (Maxadzhirstvo or “Great Exile”) of 
nearly 20,000 and 50,000 ethnic Abkhaz respectively (Lakoba 1998(a)).   
When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, Abkhazia joined the Union of 
United Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, but was occupied and incorporated into the 
newly formed Democratic Republic of Georgia one year later.  In 1921 Abkhazia and 
                                                 
31 The title to the present chapter is a reference to a 2010 news article published by the Russian World 
Foundation’s information service:  “Исполняется 200 лет единения народов России и Абхазии” (Фонд 
Русский Мир 2010). 
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Georgia joined the Soviet Union as equal and independent Union Republics (SSRs), but 
in 1931, at the behest of Stalin himself, Abkhazia was reclassified as an autonomous 
republic (ASSR), subordinate to the Georgian SSR (Lakoba 1998(b)).  As Soviet power 
waned in the late 1980s ethnic Georgian nationalists increased their control in the 
Georgian SSR, and Abkhazian elites began to vie for independence commensurate with 
its previous (1921-1931) status.  The Supreme Council of Abkhazia even adopted a 
Declaration of State Sovereignty on August 25, 1990. 
Abkhazian aspirations were ignored by Moscow, however, and when the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1991, the newly formed Republic of Georgia retained the partially 
autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Suny 1995).  Then, from 1991-
1992, Georgia fought and lost a secessionist conflict in South Ossetia, and when regional 
leaders of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic declared Abkhazia’s independence in 
June 1992, the Georgian civil war was still raging in the young republic.  Despite already 
being overextended, Georgian forces invaded Abkhazia in August 1992 and began 
another secessionist conflict, which they would also lose, resulting in Abkhazia’s de facto 
independence two years later. 
Russian engagement of Abkhazia during Boris Yeltsin’s two presidencies is best 
characterized by inconsistency and contradiction both during and after the Georgia-
Abkhazia conflict.  As explained by Sergei Markedonov, it was easy to see that by 
August 1992 multiple Russian foreign policy directions with respect to Abkhazia already 
existed, pursued by different factions vying for control in post-Soviet Russia.  These 
included the Presidential Administration, the State Duma, the military establishment and 
individual regional Russian political figures.  “Everyone was trying to use [the conflict] 
for his own internal political power-struggle” (Маркедонов 2005, 24). 
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The Russian government’s initial material and rhetorical support for Georgian 
territorial integrity and Eduard Shevardnadze’s fledgling government soon gave way 
under pressure from Russian parliamentary groups and regional military forces that 
vocally supported the Abkhazian separatist movement.  By September 1992, Russia 
began supplying the Abkhazian side with direct military aid, becoming itself party to the 
conflict.  After the ceasefire, while Russia officially took up the ostensibly neutral role of 
peacekeeper in the conflict zone, the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and 
Relations with Compatriots increased its vocal support of the Abkhazian independence 
cause, heavily criticizing Yeltsin for signing a Friendship, Good Neighborly Relations, 
and Cooperation Treaty with the Georgian government two months before the April 1994 
ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow.  In 1994 Russia closed its border with 
Abkhazia and in 1996 it joined the CIS-sponsored economic and arms embargo against 
the breakaway region.  Simultaneously, regional elites including Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov actively developed economic ties with Abkhazia, while the Duma-sponsored 
Compatriots Council signed various agricultural export agreements with the Abkhazian 
branch of the Congress of Russian Communities (an influential political organization in 
Russia) circumventing the embargo (Antonenko 2005).  It was not until after Yeltsin 
appointed Vladimir Putin as Russia’s Prime Minister in August 1999 that Russian 
policies with respect to Abkhazia began to take on a more centralized and coordinated 
character. 
RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN ABKHAZIA 
Russian interests in Abkhazia center on security, economic and ostensibly 
humanitarian concerns.  Between 1999-2009 these concerns led Moscow to pursue 
strategies intended to increase Russia’s influence over the breakaway region and to 
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strengthen the bilateral relationship between the two entities, while simultaneously 
discouraging Abkhazia’s pursuit of its own multi-vector foreign policy (Khashig 2009(b); 
Fischer 2009; Сухов 2009). 
In the security sphere Moscow is preoccupied with preserving its military 
presence and regional dominance south of the Caucasus while preventing NATO 
expansion to Russia’s south (Тренин 2004(а); Allison 2008; Blank 2008(a); IIFFMCG 
2009(a)).  In 1999 Georgia began to look West, joining the Council of Europe, leaving 
the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty, which it had joined in 1994, 
demanding withdrawal of Russian military bases and intensifying its relationship with 
NATO (IIFFMCG 2009(a)).  In March 2002, the United States launched the Georgia 
Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and in November Georgia officially applied for NATO 
membership.  The Russian government’s reaction to Tbilisi’s Westward momentum was 
resoundingly negative, calling it the “Georgian Leadership’s great mistake” (IIFFMCG 
2009(a), 7).  In hopes of counteracting Georgia’s Westward momentum in the early 
2000s, it was in Russia’s best interest to develop and maintain a close and even dominant 
relationship with Abkhazia, as this would ensure Russia’s retention of military bases and 
seaports south of the Caucasus32 and, some argued, prevent NATO’s entry into the region 
by keeping Georgia fragmented and vulnerable (Allison 2008; IIFFMCG 2009(a)).33 
Russia’s economic interests in Abkhazia reside mainly in the spheres of tourism 
and energy resources: 
                                                 
32 The Bombora airbase near Gudauta in Abkhazia possesses the largest military airfield in the South 
Caucasus. In addition, the port of Ochamchire ten to fifteen kilometers from the administrative border with 
Georgia has the potential to become a second Black Sea naval base for the Russian fleet (International 
Crisis Group 2010) 
33 The Georgian government’s complaints about Russian peacekeeping in Abkhazia were partly based on 
the perception that Russia was not “peacekeeping, but keeping in pieces,” i.e., keeping the conflicts frozen 
in order to maintain “controllable instability” in the region (IIFFMCG 2009(a), 18). 
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During the Soviet years, tourism was Abkhazia’s prime source of income, and a 
lucrative one, with a captive market for whom foreign travel was often all but 
impossible and beaches scarce. For the stylish and well heeled among the 
country’s Communist nomenclature, a yearly pilgrimage to the region…was a 
matter of prestige (International Crisis Group 2010, 6). 
Known as the “Red Riviera,” Abkhazia was the destination for millions of Russian 
tourists annually, as well as “the Russian military’s subsidized playground on the shores 
of the Black Sea,” with “spas, sanitariums and summer dachas sprinkled up and down the 
beaches” (Goltz 2006, 60).34  Alongside the tourism industry, Russia has material 
interests in possible Caspian oil deposits off the Abkhazian coast (Лента.Ру 2009) as 
well as in the de facto state’s infrastructure and construction materials as Russia prepares 
to host the 2014 Winter Olympics.35  In 2007 Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov opined that 
it was hard to imagine holding the Olympics in Sochi without the participation and 
cooperation of “such a kind neighbor as Abkhazia” (International Crisis Group 2008, 4).  
From 1999-2009, with respect to these industries and resources, and considering that 
nearly all large-scale financial contracts had to be approved by the Abkhazian central 
government, increased Russian influence in the region had the potential to be very 
profitable, for Moscow specifically and for Russia’s financial sector more generally. 
Finally, conceptualized best by a 2009 commentary on Russian soft power with 
respect to the post-Soviet “frozen conflicts,” some claimed that Russia had a 
humanitarian interest in developing a relationship with the secessionist region after 1999 
and that the Russian leadership genuinely wanted to help the Abkhazian people: 
Beyond the political rights issues there are the no-less-important concerns of 
everyday citizens, who in a state of limbo are not able to travel to see their 
relatives or friends, visit the graves of their ancestors, get medical attention in 
                                                 
34 For other discussions on Russian economic interests in the Abkhazian tourist industry see Khashig 
2002(a); and Khashig 2005. 
35 The southern Russian resort town of Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics are to be held, is located 
within 25 miles of the Russian-Abkhazian border. 
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border-region hospitals, receive an education and read the newspaper in their 
native tongue, or scrape out a living for themselves…And while politicians 
squabble over what flag flies over this or that territory, people on the “frontier” 
are unable to satisfy their most fundamental human needs (author’s translation 
Маркедонов 2009). 
This “humanitarian angle,” however, is frequently viewed as a rhetorical soft-power 
propaganda tool rather than a genuine interest of the Russian government. 
THE ABKHAZIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT 
Concerning the Russia-Abkhazia relationship from 1999-2009, it is clear that, 
driven by its interests in the region, Moscow had an interest in actively pursuing 
strategies meant to broaden its influence over the de facto state to its south, and as I will 
show, the strategies it pursued employed both Russia’s hard and soft power.  A second 
crucial element in my examination, however, concerns the interests and preferences of 
Abkhazia— both the government and the citizenry.  Recalling Goldsmith and Horiuchi’s 
model of policy instrument implementation and my discussion of the “Who’s” implied by 
such a model, I construct my analysis of Russian-Abkhazian relations based on some 
important assumptions about agency. 
Considering Putin’s consolidation of the “power vertical” in the post of President 
after 2000, his personal sway with the United Russia party, and his influence over 
Russian foreign policy as Prime Minister after 2008, it is safe to assume that Russian 
policy instruments employed between 1999-2009 with respect to Abkhazia were 
coordinated, if not directly controlled, by the Kremlin.36  On the Abkhazian side, I 
presume a similar locus of power.  Built on the infrastructure and institutions established 
in the 1994 Abkhazian Constitution, Abkhazian foreign as well as domestic policy has 
                                                 
36 For example, see the discussion of Russia’s internal political dynamics with respect to Abkhazia in 
Georgia and Russia: Clashing Over Abkhazia (International Crisis Group 2008, 12). 
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been coordinated and largely controlled from the capital of Sukhum/i37 since the mid 
1990s.  Upon close examination of the de facto state’s institutions, three domestic groups 
are found to carry political sway: the politicians in the central government, the Abkhazian 
political elite outside of the central government (including opposition parties) and the 
citizenry at large.38  Considering the remaining “Who’s” begged by Goldsmith and 
Horiuchi’s model in Chapter Two, Russian policy instruments implemented with respect 
to Abkhazia between 1999-2009 have influenced each of the above groups’ opinions and 
decisions at varying times. 
Related to the vehicle and exercise fallacies, and touching on issues of preference, 
agency and the dichotomy between correlation and causation, the “freerider” or “benefit 
fallacy” represents another potential analytical pitfall in the examination of power in 
International relations.  Put simply, just because a power-wielding agent witnesses and 
benefits from a change in another agent’s behavior does not mean that the first agent had 
any influence in bringing about that change (Berenskoetter 2007).  Concerning the 
Russia-Abkhazia relationship, if Abkhazia wanted nothing more than to follow Russia’s 
lead from day one and there was little threatening that position, then Russia would have 
little interest in expending serious resources to broaden and reinforce its influence in the 
region.  Furthermore, any analysis of the instruments used by Russia with respect to 
Abkhazia would be complicated by the “benefit fallacy,” i.e., Abkhazian compliance with 
Russian demands could not be characterized as the victory of Russian policy instruments 
                                                 
37 In the Georgian language the capital of Abkhazia is known as Sukhumi, while in Russian and Abkhaz, it 
is Sukhum. This type of spelling variation appears in the names of many cities and districts across Abkhazia 
and has become highly politicized. In an attempt to take an objective stance in relation to the politics 
surrounding the names of cities and districts in the region, I will refer to all using both endings, e.g., 
Sukhum/i, Gal/i, etc. 
38 For an examination of the Abkhazian political system and civil society see International Crisis Group 
2006; Article 19 2007; Fischer 2009; and Сухов 2009. 
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if the Abkhazians planned on complying with those demands before Russian policy 
instruments were even implemented. 
The reality of the Russia-Abkhazia relationship from 1999-2009, however, is far 
removed from the hypothetical scenario above.  Although the Abkhazian government 
initially requested, during the chaotic period following the end of the Georgia-Abkhazia 
conflict, that it be officially incorporated into the Russian Federation, this desire—
confined to a then fractured political elite—quickly faded (Гумба 2005).  Following the 
passing in 1999 of the Act on the National Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia, in 
which the 1994 Abkhazian constitution was approved by 97.7 percent of voters,39 
national independence became a non-negotiable issue for the de facto state and its people.  
And although the Abkhazian Parliament and President issued almost yearly appeals 
(President of the Republic of Abkhazia 2002; Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia 
2003; Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia 2004; Parliament of the Republic of 
Abkhazia 2006),40 requesting the establishment of “associated relations” with the Russian 
Federation, Abkhazian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Shamba explained in 2006 that 
these appeals in no way represented a desire among the Abkhazian government or people 
to become a de jure part of Russia:  “To Russia we proposed not associate membership, 
but an associate relationship between two sovereign states” (International Crisis Group 
2006, 8). 
Concerning Russian-Abkhazian relations in the 1990s, both the political elite and 
everyday citizenry remained somewhat suspicious and unsure of Moscow’s motivations 
after the end of the 1992-1994 conflict (Гумба 2005).  Much of this suspicion had its 
                                                 
39 87.6 percent of an electorate of 219,534 (58.5 percent of the pre-war electorate) participated in the 
referendum (Президент РА 1999). 
40 Tellingly, following Russian interference in the 2004 Abkhazian elections, Sukhum/i did not renew its 
request for the establishment of “associate relations” with Russia in 2005. Russian involvement in the 2004 
election crisis is discussed at length in chapter seven of the present work. 
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roots in Russia’s rhetorical and material support of Georgia during the opening phases of 
the conflict and Moscow’s rapprochement with Tbilisi immediately following the 
ceasefire (Antonenko 2005).  In September 1993 de facto Abkhazian President Vladislav 
Ardzinba sent a letter to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin criticizing what he 
saw as Russia’s two-faced economic dealings with Georgia while the former levied 
sanctions against Abkhazia (Председатель Верховного Совета РА 1993). Russia’s 
decision to close its border with Abkhazia in 1994 and participate in the CIS-sponsored 
embargo against the region beginning in 1996 further gave the Abkhazian government 
pause as to its relationship with its northern neighbor.  Finally, even as Russian-
Abkhazian relations began to improve after the ascendance of Vladimir Putin, Abkhazian 
officials repeatedly stressed the region’s historical statehood and independence from 
Russia,41 highlighting the intention to develop a multi-vector foreign policy outside of 
Moscow’s control and in spite of its wishes (International Crisis Group 2006; 
Dzieciolowski 2008; Fischer 2009; Khashig 2009(b); Сухов 2009). 
                                                 
41 In comments made to Dov Lynch in July 2000, Sergei Shamba stressed the Abkhazian “historical 
tradition of statehood,” explaining, “Abkhazia has a thousand-year history of statehood since the formation 
in the 8th century of the Kingdom of Abkhazia.  Even within the framework of empires, Abkhazia kept this 
history of stateness [sic].  No matter the form, Abkhaz statehood remained intact” (Lynch 2001, 7). 
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Chapter 5: Influencing Abkhazia 
INSTRUMENTS OF RUSSIAN POWER IN ABKHAZIA 
With the unconcealed intention of increasing its influence over the Abkhazian 
government and people, Moscow has, at different times, used all the power resources at 
its disposal, employing foreign policy instruments that project both Russian hard and soft 
power.  During the period from 1999-2009, eight main types or subsets of Russian policy 
instruments—each drawing upon various hard and soft-power resources—are visible in 
Moscow’s engagement of the de facto state.  They include (1) the presence and expansion 
of Russian military peacekeepers and other armed forces in and around Abkhazian 
territory, (2) economic aid, investment and trade, (3) border shutdowns, regional visa 
regimes, blockades and sanctions, (4) cultural exchange programs (e.g., the establishment 
of Russian cultural centers and NGOs in Abkhazia), (5) Russian ‘passportization’ 
campaigns (grants of Russian citizenship and passports to those living in Abkhazia), (6) 
political and diplomatic support and recognition of the de facto state, (7) Russian 
language and education policies (e.g., provision of textbooks, influence over curriculum, 
provision of enrollment opportunities for Abkhazians in Russian universities, etc.), and 
(8) ethno-political propaganda and rhetoric, facilitated by media penetration and 
information control. 
“Peacekeeping” forces 
Pursuant to the 14 May 1994 agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces 
between the Abkhazian and Georgian sides (Иоселиани и Джинджолия 1994) and the 9 
June 1994 Russian presidential decree on peacekeeping forces (Президент РФ 1994), on 
21 June 1994 a Russian-manned CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF) was deployed in two 
security zones along the Georgian-Abkhazian border.  The CISPKF mandate allowed for 
 47 
a force of up to 3,000 men, though by 1999 it had rarely exceeded 1,500 (Danilov 1999, 
44) and from 2004 until 2008 numbered only 1,700 troops (Antonenko 2005, 220-221; 
International Crisis Group 2006).  In late April 2008, in response to “a rise in 
provocations by Georgian power structures,” Russia began increasing its contingent of 
peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, raising the total to 2,542 by 7 May (International Crisis 
Group 2008; Khashig 2008).  On 30 May 2008 Moscow deployed an additional force of 
400 troops to the conflict zone, ostensibly to repair the railroad from Sukhum/i to 
Ochamchira (International Crisis Group 2008).42   
When the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war began, Russia transferred 9,000 
“reconnaissance and combat troops to Abkhazia” as a means of preventing “Georgia’s 
planned military invasion of [the region],” which consequently encouraged and facilitated 
the recapture by Abkhazian forces of the Upper Kodori valley, under Georgian control 
since 2006 (Allison 2008, 1157).  In 2009, Russia and Abkhazia signed a military 
cooperation treaty, a separate treaty that gave Russian troops control of the Abkhazian-
Georgian administrative border and agreements on the development of Russian military 
bases in the breakaway region.43  Western military analysts estimated that by the end of 
2009 Russian forces stationed in Abkhazia numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 including 
coast guard units, border forces and regular troops (International Crisis Group 2010).  In 
addition, some of Abkhazia’s highest military and security positions were “out-sourced” 
to Russia and are occupied by former Russian peacekeeping commanders and defense 
ministry personal to this day (Popescu 2006(a); International Crisis Group 2010). 
                                                 
42 According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense the following day, “in accordance with the 
Russian president’s decree on the humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and a request by the Abkhazia authorities, 
units from the Russian Railroad Troops and special non-military equipment have been dispatched to rebuild 
railroads and infrastructure [in Abkhazia]” (International Crisis Group 2008, 3). 
43 In August 2009 Vladimir Putin promised that Russia would spend over 465 million dollars in 2010 to 
upgrade and build bases in Abkhazia and reinforce its borders (International Crisis Group 2010, 3). 
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Russian military forces in Abkhazia, in the form of peacekeepers from 1994-2008 
and as regular forces following the Russo-Georgian war (Socor 2008(c)), are traditionally 
seen as a foreign policy instrument projecting Russian hard power.  Adhering to Nye’s 
dichotomy, the presence of these forces is said to have coerced Abkhazia into cooperating 
with Russian demands, as the peacekeepers rhetorically protected the de facto state from 
Georgian invasion, ensured the survival of the fledgling Abkhazian government, and 
could conceivably have left, removing this protection, if the Abkhazian government did 
anything to displease Moscow. This possible eventuality was something the Abkhazian 
authorities feared and desperately did not want.44 Though less pronounced, the presence 
of Russian military forces in Abkhazia had soft-power effects as well, as it contributed to 
Moscow’s image as a guardian and protector.  Russian military hard and soft power in 
Abkhazia cut both ways, however, and some feared that too close a military relationship 
would threaten Abkhazian statehood.45  In addition, the involvement of peacekeepers in 
criminal activities partially discredited them as a stabilizing and productive force in the 
minds of the Abkhazian citizenry.46 
Economic aid and investment 
Russian economic investment in Abkhazia was a very influential foreign policy 
instrument in Moscow’s engagement of the de facto state.  From 2000-2003, following 
                                                 
44 Since the introduction of CIS peacekeepers, Abkhazian government officials have repeatedly referred to 
Russia as Abkhazia’s only “peace” or “security guarantor” (Lynch 2001; Antonenko 2005; International 
Crisis Group 2006; Khashig 2008; IIFFMCG 2009(b); International Crisis Group 2010) and have stressed 
the need at times to intensify this military relationship (Khashig 2008; International Crisis Group 2010). 
45 For example, see Inal Khashig’s comments on the April 2009 agreement between Abkhazia and Russia 
“On the joint protection of the border of the Republic of Abkhazia” and the broader treaty on military 
cooperation between the two entities (Khashig 2009(b)). 
46 Dov Lynch discusses this point in Managing Separatist States: A Eurasian Case Study, highlighting the 
Gal/i region of Abkhazia in particular: “Crime mingles with geopolitics in these conflicts in an unsettling 
manner. Russian peacekeeping troops have become involved in smuggling activities across the front lines 
in Georgia and Moldova since their deployments” (Lynch 2001, 14).  See also Socor 2005(c); and 
Mirimanova and Klein 2006.  
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Moscow’s opening of the Russian-Abkhazian border, much of this investment came in 
the form of Russian tourists, who numbered 300,000 in summer 2003 (Antonenko 2005).  
Although officially party to the 1996 CIS economic and arms embargo until early 2008, 
Moscow repeatedly insisted that the embargo was counter productive, and at least one 
analyst asserted that by 2005 “there [was] little doubt that the 1996 sanctions against 
Abkhazia now exist only on paper” (Antonenko 2005, 247).  Throughout the 2000s 
infrastructure projects like the 2004 Sochi-Sukhum/i rail line and repair of the Sukhum/i-
Psou road in 2006 brought millions of Russian rubles into the Abkhazian economy, 
circumventing the CIS sanctions (International Crisis Group 2007). 
Following Russia’s withdrawal from the 1996 sanctions in March 2008 and 
following the Russo-Georgian war in August of that year, Russian economic investment 
and aid in Abkhazia increased substantially.  According to the 2010 International Crisis 
Group report, in 2009 sixty percent (65.5 million dollars) of the Abkhazian state budget 
took the form of direct support from Moscow.  In addition, according to Abkhazian 
President Bagapsh, Russia accounted for ninety-nine percent of Abkhazia’s 2009 foreign 
investment and is the region’s largest trading partner.  Abkhazian officials estimated in 
December 2009 that “80 percent of everything consumed in Abkhazia is imported from 
Russia” (International Crisis Group 2010, 6). 
Like Russia's military presence in the secessionist region, its economic aid and 
investment in Abkhazia drew primarily on Russian hard-power resources.  Applied as 
foreign policy instruments, these resources coerced Abkhazian alignment through 
monetary reward and the threat of withdrawing that reward if the “client state” deviated 
from compliance.  However, remembering that “economic power is sticky power,” 
attracting and seducing as much as it compels, it is not surprising to note additional soft-
power effects that stemmed from Russian economic activity in Abkhazia.  Characterizing 
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Russian aid in an interview with the International Crisis Group in 2006, members of the 
Abkhazian presidential staff explained: 
Russia is the one and only country that helped us in our time of need.  Our future 
development is dependent on Russia’s good will.  Especially since Putin came to 
office he has shown the courage and foresight to assist us (International Crisis 
Group 2006, 8). 
In similar remarks late in 2008, de facto President Sergei Bagapsh bitterly recalled the 
1996 CIS embargo against Abkhazia, noting that “nobody cares about [Abkhazia’s] need 
to import medicines…For years nobody wanted to invest money in [Abkhazia’s] 
economy.  Only Russia was willing to help” (Dzieciolowski 2008).  Both comments 
reflect humanitarian aspects of Russian economic aid,47 which added to the country’s 
image as a “guardian” and the only actor in the region looking out for the Abkhazians’ 
well being. 
The formation of this “protector” national image in conjunction with the sheer 
size of Russian investment had the tangible effect of building trust and loyalty among the 
Abkhazian political elite.  Despite repeatedly avowing the intention to develop a multi-
vector foreign policy, Abkhaz opposition figures and officials in 2009 scoffed at the 
concept of courting the EU, citing negative attitudes surrounding the organization’s 
monitoring mission in Georgia and dismissing EU funding projects as “a drop in the 
bucket” compared to support received from Russia (International Crisis Group 2010).  
These sentiments clearly reflected both hard and soft-power policy effects.  But Russian 
economic power also caused worry among some Abkhazians, and for much the same 
reasons as the presence of Russian military forces.  In 2009 former Abkhazian Vice 
President and current opposition leader Raul Khadjimba voiced concerns that Abkhazia 
                                                 
47 This aid has also at times included the provision of ambulances, laboratory equipment, and hospital 
supplies (Администрация Президент РА 2009(a)) 
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could be overrun by an influx of money and people from Russia: “We cannot allow 
Abkhazia to be turned into an amorphous space on the map…If we keep up the current 
tendency, we will lose ourselves.  We will disappear” (International Crisis Group 2010, 
11). 
Borders, blockades, visa regimes and sanctions 
Beginning in 1994, following the final ceasefire between Georgian and 
Abkhazian forces, and continuing throughout 1999-2009 the Russian hard-power-based 
foreign policy instruments of border shutdowns, regional visa regimes, military blockades 
and economic sanctions were used to punish and reward the Abkhazian government and 
people.  As noted in the previous chapter, during Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia closed its 
border with Abkhazia in 1994, instituted a land and sea blockade of the breakaway 
republic, cut off phone lines in the region, refused to accept Soviet passports from those 
with Abkhazian resident status crossing into Russia, and in 1996 endorsed the CIS 
economic and arms embargo against the region.  Beginning in 1999, Russia under Putin 
moved to improve relations with the de facto state.  In September 1999, Moscow 
unilaterally opened the Russian-Abkhazian border (Government of the Russian 
Federation 1999), and in December 2000 Russia instituted a visa regime with Georgia, 
notably exempting residents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (European Parliament 2001). 
While Russia officially remained party to the CIS embargo until March 2008, at least one 
analyst noted that regular cross-border trade between Russia and Abkhazia existed as 
early as 1998 (Antonenko 2005), and after Putin became president in 2000 enforcement 
of the embargo was all but ignored (Allin 2007(a); Allin 2007(b); International Crisis 
Group 2007; International Crisis Group 2008; Socor 2008(a)).  The Kremlin also used 
this subset of foreign policy tools to punish Abkhazia for what it viewed as 
 52 
insubordination, threatening and briefly closing the Russian-Abkhazia border in response 
to the 2004 election of Sergei Bagapsh over Kremlin-favorite Raul Khadjimba.48 
As noted above, border shutdowns, visa regimes, blockades and sanctions have 
obvious hard-power resource origins and in the case of the Russia-Abkhazia relationship 
were used predominately as instruments of coercion.  That being said, their application 
also affected Russian soft power with respect to Abkhazia, both positively and 
negatively.  When restrictions were lifted and embargos removed, Russia’s image as a 
“guardian” of the Abkhazian people was reinforced.49  Alternatively, when these same 
instruments were unilaterally employed against Abkhazia, they painted Russia as an 
aggressive regional hegemon.  Finally, when used to punish Abkhazia’s main enemy, as 
with the 2000 visa regime and the 2006 wine embargo against Georgia, which 
importantly exempted Abkhazian residents and produce, these policy instruments 
reinforced the attractive “allied” character of Russian-Abkhazian relations. 
NGOs and cultural exchange 
Cultural exchange was a substantial part of Russian soft power in Abkhazia from 
1999-2009.  Alongside bilateral agreements on cultural cooperation signed at the 
governmental level (Администрация Президент РА 2009(b)), and especially during 
                                                 
48 The 2004 presidential elections are discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. 
49 In their responses to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
(IIFFMCG) in 2009 the Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized Russia’s withdrawal from the 
1996 CIS embargo as a concerted and coordinated effort by the Russian government to “improve the 
economic situation of Abkhazia, lift restrictions on its foreign economic activity, ensure that its inhabitants 
benefit from the great accomplishments of Russian and other World cultures, have access to education, and 
that the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian nationals residing in Abkhazia be fully 
protected,” emphasizing that “lifting sanctions would lead to new opportunities for pursuing mutually 
beneficial relations in the economic, cultural, social and other areas” (unofficial translation by the 
IIFFMCG IIFFMCG 2009(b), 574-575).  The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs itself commenting on the 
decision to withdraw, called the embargo “completely pointless, hindering the implementation of social and 
economic programs in the region, and dooming the Abkhazian people to unwarranted hardships” (Allenova 
2008). 
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Putin’s second presidential term, Moscow invested highly “in the development of 
[Russia-friendly and Russia-financed] NGO infrastructure” in many CIS states as well as 
the secessionist entities in the former-Soviet region, for the purpose of “enhancing its 
channels to bring across the Kremlin’s message at all levels” (Popescu 2006(b), 2).  In 
December 2005 the Caucasus Institute for Democracy (CID) opened a branch in 
Sukhum/i.  A Russian NGO that claims no political agenda,50 the CID’s self proclaimed 
mission in Abkhazia was to support educational and cultural development, ease societal 
needs in the region and strengthen the cultural ties between Abkhazia and Russia 
“spreading information about Russian culture” (ИА REGNUM. 2005(a)).  After its 
opening in the Abkhazian capital, CID funded the creation a local newspaper and press 
center, gave money to Abkhazian elementary schools, sponsored scholarship 
competitions among Abkhazian university students, and organized conferences and 
roundtable discussions between Abkhazian, Russian and other regional political figures, 
addressing topics such as electoral systems, infrastructural investment and economic 
cooperation between Russia and Abkhazia during the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games.51 
Similar organizations, such as the Moscow Cultural Business Center “Dom 
Moskvy”52 and the Russian Cultural Center of the Republic of Abkhazia,53 espoused the 
nearly identical missions of supporting the development of the Abkhazian education 
system, the strengthening of cultural ties and the pursuit of business as well as 
humanitarian cooperation between Russia and Abkhazia (ИА REGNUM 2005(a); 
                                                 
50 In a 2005 interview, Abkhazian CID regional director Sokrat Jinjoli assured Abkhazian newspaper 
Chegemskaya Pravda that all the organization’s funds would be used to achieve “humanitarian goals” (ИА 
REGNUM. 2005(b)). 
51 Информационное Агентство REGNUM (официальный сайт), www.regnum.ru (accessed 8/9/11). 
52 “Московский культурно-деловой центр «Дом Москвы».” The Abkhazian branch of the Center was 
founded in Sukhum/i in March 2005 according to a special agreement signed by Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov and Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh (Дом Москвы в Городе Сукум). 
53 “Русский культурный центр Республики Абхазии” (ИА REGNUM 2005(a)) 
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Махкамова 2006). While the work of these NGOs—sponsored and funded if not directly 
controlled by Moscow—drew on Russian economic as well as cultural power resources, 
they functioned primarily as foreign policy instruments projecting Russian soft power 
due to their community involvement approach and rhetorical emphasis on humanitarian 
projects. 
Passports and citizenship 
Following the passing of the 2002 citizenship law, which simplified the 
application process for former Soviet citizens desiring to become citizens of the Russian 
Federation, and amendments to the Abkhazian citizenship law, which legalized dual 
citizenship with Russia, Abkhazians began to apply for and receive Russian passports en 
masse.  As a policy instrument drawing on a distinctive mixture of power resources 
ranging from economic to cultural, Moscow’s “passportization” campaign in the 
breakaway region represents a unique blending of Russian hard and soft power that is 
discussed at length in Chapter Six. 
Political and diplomatic support 
Nye’s third category in his tripartite division of soft-power resources affecting 
image formation in IR is foreign policies, “when they are seen as legitimate and having 
moral authority” (Nye 2004, 11).  Considering Russia’s position as the economic, 
military and cultural center of the post-Soviet region, and a country with considerable 
international clout due to its membership in influential regional and international 
organizations (OSCE, UN, etc.), Russian foreign policies carry considerable weight for 
all the post-Soviet states, even if they are not always seen as “legitimate” and “morally 
authoritative.”  For Abkhazia, some of the most influential of these foreign policies 
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concerned Russian diplomatic and political support of the de facto state, which extended 
to full recognition in August 2008. 
Reprising during Putin’s presidencies the role it adopted in the mid-1990s as a 
“powerful protagonist of the Abkhazian cause” (Antonenko 2005, 219), the Russian State 
Duma and high-level Russian politicians—specifically the leadership of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Rodina (“Motherland”) Party, but other regional leaders as 
well—continued throughout the 2000s to arrange visits with Abkhazian leaders, issue 
official statements and pass resolutions supporting the breakaway Georgian region.  In 
February 2002, chairman of the Russian State Duma’s international affairs committee, 
Dmitry Rogozin,54 announced that the committee would hold a special meeting in March 
to discuss a draft statement by the Duma recognizing the independence of Abkhazia.  
With Georgia “collapsing,” he argued, Russia had the “right to recognize the sovereignty 
and independence of Abkhazia…and to begin constructing interstate relations with them” 
(Сысоев и Двали 2002). In August 2004 Vladimir Zhirinovsky55 attempted to sail from 
Sochi to Sukhum/i “mainly for vacation but also to hold a series of meetings with the 
Abkhazian leadership” (Simonyan and Gordiyenko 2004), where he later reportedly 
declared that Abkhazia would never be a part of Georgia (Antonenko 2005, 252).  In 
March 2005 the Duma voted on a resolution, introduced by the Rodina Party, that 
proposed giving CIS associate membership to the “breakaway regions,” including 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nargorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and 
Transnistria in Moldova (Antonenko 2005, 253).56  In December 2006 the Duma issued a 
                                                 
54 Dmitry Rogozin was leader of the Rodina Party from 2003-2006 
55 Vladimir Zhirinovsky has been leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia since its creation in 
1992. 
56 Although it was voted down, it was the first time such a resolution was actually put to a vote in the 
Russian State Duma (Antonenko 2005). 
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statement acknowledging and supporting a resolution by the Abkhazian Parliament, 
which had called for recognition and the establishment of “associated relations” with 
Russia (Государственной Думы РФ 2006). In a November 2007 “slip-up” Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov publically recognized Abkhazian sovereignty, stating, “Abkhazia 
has long been a sovereign government,” supposedly forgetting to preface the title with 
“de facto” (Сухов 2007). In March 2008 the Russian Duma again issued a statement 
reinforcing Russia’s commitment to protect its citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
calling on the Russian government to “decisively oppose any foreign policy, economic or 
military attack on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria,” and urging the President to 
“examine the advisability of recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia” (Государственной Думы РФ 2008(a)). Finally, in late August 2008 the Duma 
called on President Dmitry Medvedev to fully recognize Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
independence following the short but decisive Russo-Georgian war (Государственной 
Думы РФ 2008(b)). 
In addition to declarations of support and resolutions on independence, the 
Russian government—largely under the supervision of Modest Kolerov’s Presidential 
Department for Interregional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries—organized 
political support on a regional and even international level for Abkhazia and the other 
post-Soviet secessionist entities.  From early 2005 onward, Moscow organized and 
hosted a number of semi-annual (Socor 2005(a); Socor 2005(b); Socor 2006(a); Socor 
2007(a)) conclaves, ministerial talks and summits for the de facto authorities of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, creating what became unofficially known as 
the “SNG-2” and even “NATO-2.”57  The Russian government also attempted in April 
                                                 
57 “The Russian for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyh Gosudartsv, 
or SNG. But SNG-2 stands for Sodruzhestvo Nepriznanyh Gosudartsv (Community of Unrecognised 
States). Sometimes the SNG-2 is translated into English as CIS-2, but it does not reflect the play of words 
 57 
2007 to get de facto Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba admitted to UN Security 
Council deliberations on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, protesting vociferously when 
he was denied a US visa (Socor 2007(b)). 
For their part, Russian Presidents Putin and Medvedev also made their political 
support for Abkhazia known, though through fewer declarations.  On 16 April 2008 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian government to “interact 
with the actual organs of power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, cooperating on the 
economic, social and scientific fronts as well as in the spheres of information, culture and 
education, while enlisting the assistance of regional Russian entities” (author’s 
translation МИД РФ 2008). Commenting on the President’s order, Vladimir Socor 
quipped, “Moscow’s move seems to follow the motto: ‘Everything but official 
recognition’” (Socor 2008(b)). Official recognition followed five months later 
(Президент РФ 2008). 
Political support and recognition as an instrument of foreign policy is difficult to 
categorize with reference to a hard-power/soft-power dichotomy.  Although it draws on 
the soft-power resources of clout, reputation, legitimacy and agenda-setting potential, this 
kind of support is often understood—and rightly so—to be one-half of a quid pro quo 
deal or, alternatively, the physical form of some other implied agreement.  In their 
response to the 2009 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia (IIFFMCG) the Abkhazian government seemed to see Russian recognition in 
this way, stating, “by its decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, in essence 
Russia shielded the Abkhazian people from bloodshed and more military aggression, 
restored their statehood that had been stripped from Abkhazia under Stalin and fostered 
                                                                                                                                                  
between SNG and SNG-2. In addition to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, SNG-2 includes also 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The second informal name for the group of secessionist entities is NATO-2, which is 
an acronym for Nagorno- Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Ossetia” (quoted in Popescu 2006(a)). 
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stability in the region” (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 1).  In a December 2009 interview with 
International Crisis Group, taking place before the presidential elections that year, a high-
ranking Abkhazian official suggested the same: 
We [the Abkhazians] are under no illusions about the asymmetrical relationship 
we have [with Russia]…We have two main concerns: security and our economy. 
Our relationship with Russia meets our needs in both areas. We have the amount 
of independence that we require” (International Crisis Group 2010, 11).  
While this may have been the point of view of the Abkhazian government, it is likely that 
Russian recognition also had soft-power effects among the Abkhazian population at 
large, especially if it was viewed as a guarantee of safety from a possible Georgian 
attack. 
Language and education policy 
As one of Moscow’s best-developed foreign policy instruments in its near abroad, 
Russian language and education policy was actively used in its relationship with 
Abkhazia as well and did much to tie the two entities together.  On a governmental level, 
Russian was incorporated functionally as a second national language in Abkhazia.  
According to Article 6 of the 1994 Abkhazian constitution, “the official language of the 
Republic of Abkhazia is Abkhazian,” but “the Russian language as well as the Abkhazian 
language shall be recognized as the language of the government, public and other 
institutions” (author’s translation Верховный Совет РА 1994).  Moscow’s influence can 
also be seen in the Abkhazian Ministry of Education.  In 1995 the Ministry approved a 
new statewide curriculum that included the gradual phasing out of Georgian-language 
education, to be replaced by Russian (particularly in the southern Gal/i district, where the 
majority of inhabitants are ethnically Georgian) (Denber 2011, 50).   What is more, many 
of the textbooks used in the Gal/i district, as well as the rest of Abkhazia, came from 
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Russia as humanitarian aid.  Over 200,000 such textbooks were donated in 2006 alone 
(АПСНЫПРЕСС 2007; UN Country Team in Georgia 2008, 35). Beyond influencing 
Abkhazian curriculum, the Russian Ministry of Education continued to expand quotas for 
Abkhazian students wishing to study in Russian universities. Under the quota system 770 
Abkhazian students were admitted between 1993-2008, with yearly caps ranging from 
twenty-one (1999) to fifty-five (2007).  In 2009 the Russian Ministry of Education 
reserved 100 places for Abkhazian applicants (Итар-Тасс 2009). 
Support for the Russian language was likewise pervasive in Abkhazia on a 
societal level.  The Russian World Foundation (RWF), discussed in Chapter Three, is 
extraordinarily active in the region, sponsoring fifteen organizations in eight cities and 
towns across Abkhazia with a mission to promote the “conservation and popularization of 
Russian language and culture.”58  A prime example of the kinds of activities funded and 
sponsored by organizations like RWF is “Russian Language, Education and Culture 
Week,” held in the Abkhazian capital from 1-5 October 2009.  Funded in cooperation 
with the Russian Federal Education Agency as part of the Target Program “Russian 
Language (2006-2010),”59 Moscow State University organized a series of seminars on the 
teaching of Russian language and literature, as well as roundtables focusing on the 
development of Russian-Abkhazian cultural ties.  The sponsors also held a competition 
for Abkhazian students, testing their knowledge of Russian language and culture.  The 
stated goals of the event were to create a common educational space and facilitate the 
                                                 
58 List of organizations available at 
http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?action=select&country=896&catalog=&gof
ind.x=8&gofind.y=9 (accessed 8/9/11) 
59 “Федеральной Целевой Программы 'Русский Язык (2006 - 2010 годы).’”  The self-stated goals of the 
program were to facilitate an expanded role for the Russian language in the development of CIS 
integration; support the popularization and teaching of Russian language and culture; and better fulfill the 
linguistic and cultural needs of Russian compatriots abroad (Правительство РФ 2005). 
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formation of a positive image of Russia through cultural and linguistic contact (Фонд 
Русский Мир 2009). 
Russian language and education policy was one of Moscow’s purest forms of soft 
power in Abkhazia, and its use substantially increased Russia’s influence over the 
secessionist region.  In a 2005 background paper “Prospects for Return of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in Georgia,” the Norway Refugee Council 
characterized Russian cultural influence over Abkhazia as follows: 
Abkhazian de facto authorities seem to pursue a policy that aims to weaken the 
position of Georgian [language and] culture in Abkhazia… These developments, 
apparently occurring with the support by [sic] Russia, can be understood as 
attempts to build a genuine Abkhazian nation (state) based on strong [sic] 
influence of Russian culture and language (Svendsen 2005, 20). 
However, where Russian policies interfered with the Abkhazian government’s 
own policies promoting Abkhaz language, history and culture, social tensions in the de 
facto state arose.  In a July 2009 interview in Tbilisi, Georgia, a prominent ethnically 
Abkhaz member of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in Exile 
emphasized the fear, widespread among ethnically Abkhaz youths in the breakaway 
region, that the Abkhaz ethnos was being systematically destroyed by Russian 
influence.60  Though resistant to “cultural” and “linguistic assimilation,” these youths saw 
little other choice, considering the diminished usefulness of the Abkhaz language in 
                                                 
60 In comments made at a 2004 conference on “Abkhazia in the Context of Contemporary International 
Relations,” George Hewitt noted that many in Abkhazia encourage their children to pursue a Russian-
language education only.  He called this a “dangerous view, as it is a powerful first step towards complete 
russification of the young,” adding later that “if the language goes, Abkhazian culture, everything 
understood by the term apswara (“Abkhazian virtue”), will ultimately perish” (Hewitt 2004).  Rachel 
Clogg’s 2008 research on Abkhazian identity supports Hewitt’s viewpoint: “Language is a particularly 
sensitive issue for the Abkhaz, most of whom equate losing their language with a loss of cultural identity” 
(Clogg 2008, 315). 
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comparison to Russian.61  In this way Russian policies also bred resentment in one of the 
very populations Moscow was trying to win over to its side. 
Media penetration and information control as propaganda tools 
In his 2007 paper on “Russia’s Information Policy in Lithuania,” Nerijus 
Maliukevicius comments on Russia’s use of information and communication 
technologies in the post-Soviet region: 
To regain the influence it had lost in post-Soviet countries, Russia resorts to 
information and communication technologies as well as the media and uses them 
as hard-power tools of political and ideological struggle in a transformed 
international environment (Maliukevicius 2007, 154). 
While his classification of Russian information policies as hard power may be 
controversial, nonetheless we can see that Moscow actively used these same information 
and communication technologies to shore up its influence in Abkhazia as well.  Stressing 
local reliance on television and radio as primary sources of information, a 2007 report by 
the London-based human rights organization Article 19, addressing information access in 
Abkhazia, highlighted Russian media penetration in the de facto state: 
In addition to Abkhazian television, all households have access to Russian 
television (1st Channel, Kanal Rossiya and NTV), which constitutes an important 
source of information. The information it includes about Abkhazia itself is 
limited, but has increased since relations with Georgia have deteriorated over the 
past few years (Article 19 2007, 16). 
Despite emphasizing that “Russian television itself is not independent and reflects 
mainly President Putin’s policies,” the report depicted a level of trust in the Russian 
media among the Abkhazian population: “Many ordinary people and civil society 
activists…criticized Abkhazian television as considerably worse than Russian television 
                                                 
61 Член Верховного Совета Автономной Республики Абхазия (в Грузии). Interview with author. 
Tbilisi, Georgia, 21 July 2009. 
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in terms of objectivity and relevance,” noting that they often received “more information 
about political events in Abkhazia – they mentioned as an example peace negotiations – 
from Russian television and more quickly, too” (Article 19 2007, 86). 
In addition to television penetration in Abkhazia, Moscow also had a radio 
presence in the secessionist region.  The “independent” twenty-four-hour Russian-
language radio station Radio Soma based in Sukhum/i broadcast popular music, as well 
as news and occasional live talk shows with invited guests, and was reportedly extremely 
popular throughout the country (Article 19 2007).  Tellingly, Radio Soma is listed as a 
partner of the state-owned Russian radio company Voice of Russia, whose self-purported 
mission as an arm of the Russian government is to 
familiarize the global community with Russian life and the country’s point of 
view concerning world events, to facilitate the strengthening of a positive image 
of Russia in the world, to establish a dialogue with Russian compatriots abroad 
and to promote the popularization of Russian culture and Russian language 
(author’s translation Голос России). 
Ideal tools for projecting the soft power of culture and political ideology, media 
resources like those in the hands of the Russian government in Abkhazia are frequently 
used for the more nefarious task of spreading propaganda.  Russian ethno-political 
propaganda and rhetoric in Abkhazia, communicated in large part through Russian media 
resources, focused on the creation of exclusive “us vs. them” narratives, which at varying 
times pit an amalgamated “hypocritical West” or “imperial Georgia” against Russian-
Abkhazian solidarity. In late January 2006, in comments reported and later analyzed by 
the two major Russian television stations (Вести 2006; Первый Канал 2006; Познер 
2007; Познер 2008), Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the possibility of a 
precedent being set by the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.  Stressing the need for 
“universal principles” when discussing the recognition of secessionist states, Putin 
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blatantly drew parallels between Kosovo and Abkhazia, suggesting that “if someone 
thinks Kosovo can be granted full independence, then why should we refuse the same 
right to the Abkhazians or South Ossetians?”  Referring to Turkey’s unilateral 
recognition of North Cyprus, he added, “Now I’m not saying Russia is going to 
immediately recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent states, but such 
international precedents do exist” (author’s translations Путин 2006). The so-called 
“Kosovo precedent” quickly ballooned and within a month, Abkhazian President Sergei 
Bagapsh remarked, “if the issue of Kosovo is settled [in favor of independence], lets say, 
and not the issue of Abkhazia, that is a policy purely of double standards” (De Waal 
2006).  The controversial topic remained at the center of Russia’s discussion of the 
regions until the onset of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war and was even referred to 
in the State Duma’s recommendation to President Medvedev that Russia officially 
recognize the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
In addition to the rhetoric surrounding Kosovo’s independence movement, 
Moscow continually pointed to Georgian defense spending, military cooperation with the 
United States,62 various internal displays of force63 and the country’s refusal to sign a 
declaration on the non-use of force with relation to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
negotiation processes (International Crisis Group 2007) as indictors that the Western-
backed “little empire” was bent on a military solution to the separatist conflicts (Socor 
                                                 
62 In March 2002, the United States launched the sixty-four-million-dollar Georgia Train and Equip 
Program (GTEP) with the goal of modernizing Georgia’s military, ostensibly to fight terrorists supposedly 
located in the Pankisi Gorge (Devdariani 2005, 183), and after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Russian 
government accused the US of continuing to provide military aid to Georgia, in effect rearming their 
offensive forces 
(Daily Star 2009). 
63 Among others these included Georgia’s June 2004 incursion into South Ossetia (IIFFMCG 2006(a)), its 
occupation of the Kodori gorge adjacent to Abkhazia from July 2006 (International Crisis Group 2007), 
and multiple unmanned drone flights over Abkhazian territory in March and April 2008 (International 
Crisis Group 2008) 
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2006(b)). This assumption reinforced Sukhum/i’s fear that a Georgian attack was eminent 
and strengthened the “siege mentality” already existent in Abkhazia, where the only thing 
preventing another bloody war was the presence of Russian peacekeepers.  An effect of 
this mentality, Bagapsh explained Abkhazian resistance to “internationalizing” the 
peacekeeping force in Georgia by highlighting the viewpoint that the countries that would 
provide these forces are allies of Georgia, who in the past have armed and trained the 
country’s military (International Crisis Group 2007, 15).  In a May 2008 interview with 
Spanish-language newspaper El Pais, Bagapsh dubbed Georgia “an aggressive state that 
Europe has armed to the teeth…Think about where they are going to shoot,” he 
continued, “they will shoot us” (author’s translation Bonet 2008). By creating and 
reinforcing these exclusive narratives, however manipulative or underhanded, Russian 
propaganda in Abkhazia reinforced the political ties between Moscow and Sukhum/i 
considerably. 
A TIMELINE OF HARD AND SOFT ENGAGEMENT 
When taking a broad look from the standpoint of hard and soft power at Russia’s 
1999-2009 engagement of Abkhazia—and Abkhazian reaction to this engagement—two 
notable trends emerge.  First, individual policy instruments observed during the period 
frequently drew on Russian hard and soft-power resources simultaneously, and as a result 
projected both hard and soft power when implemented.  Second, concerning the character 
of Moscow’s policy application, one can divide its decade-long engagement of Abkhazia 
into two distinctive periods occupying either side of the 2004 Abkhazian presidential 
poll.  Discussed at length in Chapter Seven, the period following the 2004 elections in 
Abkhazia witnessed a shift in Russian policy with respect to the de facto state, and 
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Moscow’s involvement in the electoral crisis is one of the clearest illustrations of the 
weaknesses and dangers of uneven and overzealous policy application. 
Approaching these trends in the next two chapters, I discuss at length Russia’s 
“passportization” campaign as an example of a policy instrument drawing on both hard 
and soft power resources simultaneously, and explore the 2004 Abkhazian presidential 
poll as turning point in Russian Abkhazian-policy as well as a miniature case study 
analyzing the use of various policy instruments in concert and the dangers of overly 
aggressive policy application. 
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Chapter 6: “Passportizing” Abkhazia 
Moscow’s naturalization campaign in Abkhazia—its provision of Russian 
Federation passports and incorporation of the region and populace into its foreign policy 
rhetoric—began in earnest in 2002.  Concerning Russia’s Abkhazia policy more 
generally, this “passportization” campaign was just another instrument in the Kremlin’s 
toolbox, intended to increase its influence over the Georgian breakaway region.  
However, as a policy instrument projecting Russian power, Moscow’s distribution of 
passports and granting of citizenship in Abkhazia drew on a unique blend of Russian hard 
and soft-power resources that merits closer examination.  Whereas earlier studies of 
Russian “passportization” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have evaluated the legality of 
the process and addressed motivations for applying for and accepting Russian citizenship, 
my analysis here centers on how the process in Abkhazia has affected Moscow’s 
projection of Russian hard and soft power in that region, especially since the majority of 
Abkhazians are now passport-carrying Russian citizens. 
RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW 
On 31 May 2002 a new Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation 
passed through the State Duma and was signed into law by President Vladimir Putin.  
Importantly, the new citizenship legislation included a modified procedure for acquiring 
Russian citizenship.  Article 14, “Acquisition of Russian Federation Citizenship Under 
Simplified Procedure”64—cynically dubbed a “fast track” by some critics—waved for 
certain foreign applicants many of the requirements for citizenship specified in Part 1, 
Article 13 of the same law.  According to the Independent International Fact-Finding 
                                                 
64 In Russian, “Прием в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке” (Правительство 
РФ 2002). 
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Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), it was Article 14—specifically Part 4—
that was used for the naturalization of the majority of residents living in Abkhazia after 
2002: 
Foreign citizens and stateless persons who were citizens of the USSR, who have 
come to the Russian Federation from states that were part of the USSR, who were 
registered at their place of residence in the Russian Federation as of 1 July 2002, 
or who have received permission to stay in the Russian Federation on a temporary 
basis or a permit for residence in the Russian Federation, shall be granted Russian 
Federation citizenship under a simplified procedure without regard to the 
provision of items “a”, “c” and “e” of Part I of Article 13 of this Federal Law if, 
Prior to 1 July 2009, they declare their wish to become citizens of the Russian 
Federation (quoted in IIFFMCG 2009(a), 165-166).65 
The waved provisions included requirements that the applicant, at the time of application, 
have had lived in the Russian Federation continuously for five years, that he or she have 
sufficient means for subsistence as fixed by law and that he or she have a mastery of the 
Russian language.  The new law took effect 1 July 2002. 
NATURALIZING THE ABKHAZIANS 
Although a modest number of Abkhazian residents possessed Russian citizenship 
prior to the enactment of the new law, Russian “passportization” of the breakaway 
region’s inhabitants began on a large scale only after 2002.  As Gatis Pelnens explains, 
within a month of the law passing into effect “application centers were set up in six out of 
seven regions in Abkhazia,” while the “mountainous and remote villages of Abkhazia 
were visited by special field brigades.”  Documents were reportedly being distributed 
                                                 
65 In Russian, “Иностранные граждане и лица без гражданства, имевшие гражданство СССР, 
прибывшие в Российскую Федерацию из государств, входивших в состав СССР, и 
зарегистрированные по месту жительства в Российской Федерации по состоянию на 1 июля 2002 
года либо получившие разрешение на временное проживание в Российской Федерации или вид на 
жительство, принимаются в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке без 
соблюдения условий, предусмотренных пунктами «а», «в» и «д» части первой статьи 13 настоящего 
Федерального закона, если они до 1 июля 2009 года заявят о своем желании приобрести 
гражданство Российской Федерации” (Правительство РФ 2002). 
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within three to eight days (Pelnens 2009, 120).  Oksana Antonenko claims that by the end 
of the year, “over 50,000 Abkhazian residents had received Russian passports or Russian 
stamps in their old Soviet passports (later these passports were replaced by official 
Russian passports)” (Antonenko 2005, 240).  The Russian campaign, encouraged by the 
Abkhazian authorities, continued apace, and although accurate and consistent figures are 
difficult to obtain,66 the Abkhazian government’s claim in 2009 that “practically all the 
inhabitants of Abkhazia are at the same time citizens of the Russian Federation” is almost 
certainly true (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 575). 
The Georgian government immediately responded to what they saw as the 
obvious hostile implications of the new citizenship legislation.  In 2002 Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze railed against the new law, calling it “covert annexation” 
of Georgian territory and a “violation of Georgia’s sovereignty” (quoted in Allin 2007(b), 
31).  Since 2002, the Georgian government has continued to protest Russian grants of 
citizenship in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in its responses to the 2009 
IIFFMCG inquiry, Georgian officials characterized Russia’s “process of illegal 
passportization” as “designed and implemented as a significant component of Russia’s 
creeping annexation” of Georgian territory, accelerated67 after the 2008 Russo-Georgian 
war (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 180). 
In response to the accusations of the Georgian government, in early 2003 the 
Russian Ambassador to Georgia dismissed the idea of a Russian “passportization” 
                                                 
66 Antonenko cites Abkhazia’s de facto Vice President Valery Arshba’s claims in August 2004 that 
“170,000 of 320,000 Abkhazian residents (fifty-three percent) had become Russian citizens and that 70,000 
more were awaiting approval” (Antonenko 2005, 254).  In August 2005 de facto President Sergei Bagapsh 
claimed that eighty-four percent of Abkhazians held Russian citizenship (Peuch 2005), while a year later, in 
September 2006, de facto Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Maksim Gvindzhia claimed only eighty 
percent had acquired Russian passports (IIFFMCG 2009(a), 147). 
67 The Georgian government alleged that 4,600 newly printed Russian passports were handed out during 
the five-day conflict alone (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 182). 
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campaign, emphasizing the legal right of Abkhazian residents to apply for Russian 
citizenship and his country’s obligation to consider their applications (Allin 2007(b)).68 
Despite the Russian Ambassador’s deflection, both the Georgian government and 
independent observers69 have confirmed that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
active in printing and distributing Russian passports to Abkhazian residents after 2002 
(IIFFMCG 2009(b)).  Whatever the semantics, all sides agree, with varying degrees of 
cynicism, that the granting of Russian citizenship to Abkhazian as well as South Ossetian 
residents has been integral in the strengthening of the relationship between the two 
regions and Russia. 
THE HARD AND SOFT POWER OF CITIZENSHIP 
Commenting on Abkhazian motivations for accepting Russian citizenship, in 
2009 the IIFFMCG concluded that “according to information available…the Russian 
“passportization” policy was not, in general, based on use of force, but rather on political, 
economic and social incentives” (IIFFMCG 2009(a), 175).  As previously mentioned, 
Moscow’s “passportization” of Abkhazia is a unique example of a policy instrument that 
draws on both hard and soft-power resources and, as I detail below, this instrument 
simultaneously projected both hard and soft power when it was used with respect to 
Abkhazia following 2002. 
Hard “passportization” 
Russian citizenship carried with it multiple economic and security-based 
incentives, creating a hard-power structure of coercion—through inducement and 
                                                 
68 The Ambassador also ironically pointed out that in the previous decade 650,000 Georgian residents had 
received Russian citizenship and passports or residency registration without protest (Allin 2007(b), 31) 
69 Nicu Popescu noted in 2006 that “the information about the issuing authority on Russian passports in 
Abkhazia clearly state that they are issued by “MID Rossii”, that is the Foreign Ministry of Russia. 
Author’s observation in Sukhum(i), Abkhazia, March 2006” (Popescu 2006(a)). 
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threat—which compelled Abkhazian cooperation and compliance with Russia.  The most 
frequently cited of these incentives is economic, namely that of access to Russian 
pensions. 
The Abkhazian government does possess its own pension program and in 2006 
the Abkhazian pension fund estimated that it distributed eight million Russian rubles, 
equivalent to 320,000 dollars per month to local inhabitants (International Crisis Group 
2006).  However, in its 2006 report on Abkhazia, the International Crisis Group (ICG) 
called pensions from Sukhum/i, which averaged four dollars per month, more “symbolic” 
than anything else, noting that Abkhazian residents possessing Russian passports also 
received much larger pensions from the Russian government. In August 2005 Abkhazian 
President Sergei Bagapsh underscored this point, claiming 
About seventy percent of pensioners [in Abkhazia] receive Russian pensions.70 
This process is continuing. It does not stop. I think we need another six to twelve 
months before practically on hundred percent of the Abkhaz population become 
citizens of the Russian Federation. And we shall do it (quoted in Allin 2007(b), 
34). 
Russian pensions in Abkhazia have been cited by various observers as ranging 
between 1,200 and 1,600 rubles (forty-five to sixty-four dollars) per month, which is ten 
times higher than those provided by the Abkhazian government (Popescu 2006(a); 
International Crisis Group 2006; IIFFMCG 2009(a); Khashig 2009(a)), and in 2005 
Russian pensions in the de facto state reportedly totaled eighteen million dollars—equal 
to more than half the annual state budget (International Crisis Group 2006).  By 2007 that 
investment had grown to over twenty-three million dollars71 (IIFFMCG 2009(a)).  
                                                 
70 The Abkhazian pension fund reported in 2006 that some 51,000 persons received pensions from 
Sukhum/i, and some 27,000, pensions from Russia (International Crisis Group 2006).  Based on a 2006 
interview with the de facto Deputy-Prime Minister of Abkhazia, Nicu Popescu estimated Russian pension 
numbers in the territory at 30,000 (Popescu 2006(a), 5). 
71 590 million rubles converted at 25 rubles/USD 
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Carrying a hard-power laden economic weight of this magnitude, it is easy to see how 
grants of Russian citizenship had the capacity to substantially increase Russian influence 
over Abkhazia. 
Additional hard-power effects of Russia’s “passportization” campaign in 
Abkhazia concerned the quid pro quo of security guarantees.  In 2002 the de facto 
Abkhazian Prime Minister, Anri Djergenia expressed pride in his Russian citizenship, 
explaining, “the more Russian citizens who live in Abkhazia, the greater the guarantee 
that Georgia will not begin a new war. Every great power is duty-bound to defend its 
citizens, wherever they live” (Khashig 2002(b)). Multiple comments made by Russian 
politicians, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Russian President indicated that Moscow 
would physically protect Russian citizens outside the borders of the Russian Federation, 
and in August 2008, this became Moscow’s primary justification for its involvement in 
the Russo-Georgian war.72  Accordingly, possession of Russian citizenship for the 
Abkhazians was a physical guarantee of safety, in essence promising that if they followed 
Russia, she would protect them from Georgia and its allies. 
Soft “passportization” 
It is similarly intriguing to look at grants of Russian citizenship in Abkhazia from 
a soft-power standpoint.  Primarily the soft-power aspects of the policy instrument related 
to humanitarian concerns connected with Abkhazian residents’ ability to travel abroad, 
but also touched on the economic concerns just discussed. 
                                                 
72 On 8 August 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “Russia will not allow the death of its 
compatriots to go unpunished ... the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are, will be protected.”  
On 12 August 2008, Russian NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin exclaimed, “the issue of using military force to 
protect our citizens is a matter of principle.”  Finally, on 12 September 2008 President Medvedev asserted, 
“protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our 
country” (Allison 2008). 
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With their old Soviet passports expired since 1999, and possessing a “sheer 
disdain…at any suggestion that they apply for Georgian passports” (Hewitt 2008, 91), 
Abkhazian residents found themselves in the early 2000s unable to travel outside the 
borders of their de facto state.73  For many in Abkhazia this inability to travel had serious 
humanitarian implications.  In 2001, Dov Lynch observed: 
The Abkhaz[ians], in particular, are deeply isolated from the rest of the world. 
There are no telephone links. Without recognized passports, the Abkhaz[ians] are 
forced to bribe their way across the Russian border. These difficulties create a 
feeling of psychological isolation, in which the traumatic experience of the war 
has not been assuaged. As one member of Abkhaz[ian] civil society described it: 
‘We live in a reserve!’ (Lynch 2001, 20). 
In 1998 Sergei Bagapsh, in his capacity as Abkhazian Prime Minister, met with 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to request assistance concerning the region’s 
passport problem.  Shevardnadze reportedly angrily refused to issue any kind of Georgian 
passports to Abkhazian residents, suggesting that they make do with UN travel 
documents.  However, UN travel documents were slow in coming, and were eventually 
denied the Abkhazians.  In response to Shevardnadze’s suggestion, Bagapsh exclaimed in 
1998, “we will ask Russia to help – and in five years most of our citizens with have 
Russian passports” (Dzieciolowski 2008).  Although this timeline may have been slightly 
exaggerated, Bagapsh’s statement is no less prophetic.  In its answers to the 2009 
IIFFMCG inquiry, the Abkhazian government explained:  
Our request to be issued travel documents modeled on those the UN had issued to 
the inhabitants of Kosovo was rejected. After the Abkhazian authorities were told 
                                                 
73 In her 2002 Stories I Stole From Georgia, Wendell Steavenson relates an October 1999 conversation 
with her handler from the Abkhazian State Security Service: 
- “It’s impossible to get out of this place – I had an invitation to London, now I have another to a 
conference in America but I have no passport. Just an old Soviet passport.” 
- “The Russians cancelled them this year, didn’t they?” 
- “Yes, they cancelled them. You can’t even travel to Moscow with an old Soviet passport any more.” 
(quoted in Allin 2007(b), 32) 
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that Kosovo and Abkhazia were entirely different cases, many people began 
turning to Russia for help (at first it was mainly individual cases but eventually it 
became a mass phenomenon.) So in actual fact only Russia came to our 
assistance, agreeing to provide the people of Abkhazia with international-type 
Russian passports.  From that moment on Abkhazians were able to travel outside 
the Republic and take advantage of the rights and freedoms afforded to them 
under international laws and standards (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 576). 
Expanding on this point, a Russian commentator in 2004 remarked: 
From the point of view, as I understand it, of the majority of Abkhazian residents, 
it was not so much that they wanted to become “Russians,” as much as they did 
not want, when it came down to it, to live in the ghetto in which they had ended 
up (author’s translation Тренин 2004(b), 132). 
Furthermore, in a society whose economy had been isolated by embargo and 
devastated by years of sanctions, the economic assistance provided by Russian pensions 
could certainly be seen from a humanitarian perspective as well.  Accordingly, by giving 
the Abkhazians the opportunity to “travel freely into and out of their country as 
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights” (IIFFMCG 2009(b), 576) and 
by granting pensioners unable to support themselves the means to finally do so, Russia 
was defending the human rights of the Abkhazians, and as such, had their best interests in 
mind.  In this way, Moscow’s instrument of “passportization” contributed to the 
attractiveness of the Russia’s national image with respect to the Abkhazians, enhancing 
Russian soft power in the de facto state. 
ABKHAZIAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE GEORGIA FACTOR 
Ironically, the soft-power laden attraction that Russian “passportization” 
actualized in Abkhazia was substantially diminished by the instrument’s simultaneous 
hard-power effects: Moscow’s repeated vows to protect Russian citizens abroad were 
actually threatening to the Abkhazian political identity.  In 2004 Tsiza Gumba, a deputy 
in the Abkhazian parliament, urged her countrymen to refuse Russian citizenship and 
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wait for UN travel documents “in order to prevent the threat of annexation by Russia” 
(quoted in Allin 2007, 50).  Although the Abkhazian government had established the 
legality of dual Russian-Abkhazian citizenship in 2004,74 Moscow actively discouraged, 
“trying its best to slow if not stop,” the production and distribution of Abkhazian national 
passports in 2006, leading many to interpret Russia’s “passportization” of Abkhazia as 
nothing more than a method of repressing the region’s independent development 
(Мелконян 2007). In this context, Sukhum/i’s massive campaign to print and distribute 
Abkhazian passports and citizenship documents in 2007 (Администрация Президент РА 
2007) represented a real concern among the Abkhazian leadership with establishing and 
conserving a civic identity separate from that of the Russian Federation.75 
Abkhazians were also not naïve concerning their role in Russia’s relationship with 
Georgia—and by extension, the United States.  As one observer noted: 
There was an element of cruelty [in Russian passportization policies] with respect 
to Tbilisi. “You are not taking our interests76 into consideration? Fantastic. You 
are courting the Americans? Outstanding. You call Russia imperialist and 
predatory, etc.? Fine. But we are going to give the Abkhazians Russian 
citizenship and will not be asking your permission” (author’s translation Тренин 
2004(b), 132). 
Up until the 2008 Russo-Georgian war there existed a very real fear, expressed by many 
in Abkhazia, that “Russia’s commitment is superficial, that Abkhazia is a pawn in a 
broader political game with Georgia and the US, and that if Georgian and Russia become 
allies, Moscow might ‘sell out’ Abkhazia” (International Crisis Group 2006, 8).  Finally, 
the fact that Moscow only provided the Abkhazians with Russian international passports, 
                                                 
74 Enshrined in Article 6 of the 2004 Law on the Citizenship of the Republic of Abkhazia, Russia is the 
only country with which an Abkhazian citizen may establish dual citizenship (Правительство РА 2004). 
75 Moscow seemed to change its position, however, when in 2009 it declared it would accept Abkhazian 
passports issued after 2008 as legal identification in the Russian Federation (ОСинформ 2009).  
76 The interests implied by the observer relate to Georgia’s Western alignment and intention to join NATO. 
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which importantly lacked the residency registration necessary for extended stays in the 
Russian Federation, further reinforced the point of view that Moscow’s extension of 
citizenship represented only a temporary relationship lacking both depth and permanence 
(International Crisis Group 2006). 
A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE? 
Citing focus group interviews that suggested “almost no ethnic Abkhaz voted in 
the 2004 Russian presidential elections, pay Russian taxes or serve in the Russian 
military,” the International Crisis Group characterized Abkhazian acceptance of Russian 
passports as signifying “a formal acceptance of citizenship that several Abkhazians 
described as fictional.’  They are happy to accept the benefits Moscow offers without 
feeling any further obligation” (International Crisis Group 2006, 10).  Expanding this 
claim, one analysis summarizes Russian “passportization” in Abkhazia as merely a 
marriage of convenience: 
As with a marriage of convenience, which twists a legal institution grounded in 
sincerity of mutual feeling in order to provide benefits to both parties involved, 
Russia’s passportization twisted the concept of citizenship in order to provide 
benefits to both the Russian government and the Abkhazians without generating 
the sense of mutual commitment normally inherent in the state-citizen relationship 
(Allin 2007(b), 54). 
While such an analysis might well illustrate a cynical point of view shared among 
many Abkhazians at various levels of society, it is nonetheless overstated.  As a foreign 
policy instrument, Moscow’s grants of citizenship in Abkhazia project real Russian 
power—both hard and soft—and simply dismissing it as a marriage of convenience 
misses the point.  Though resistant to Moscow’s overtures at least to a certain extent, 
Sukhum/i, as the capital of an isolated and largely unrecognized secessionist region, 
found itself in a difficult position in the early 2000s.  Russian pensions and security 
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guarantees were, and remain, real to the Abkhazian government and people, as does the 
humanitarian relief provided by the ability to travel abroad. 
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Chapter 7: Managing Abkhazian Democracy 
In October 2004 Abkhazia held its first multi-candidate popular presidential 
elections.  Intent on having a say in Abkhazia’s political future, Moscow opted to levy its 
cultural, political, military and economic resources on the de facto state, hoping to force 
its will on the Abkhazian electorate.  What resulted was an unprecedented political crisis 
that nearly escalated to civil war. 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter Five, the 2004 Abkhazian elections represent a 
unique moment in the evolution of Russia’s Abkhazia policy.  The backlash to Moscow’s 
interference in the political process illustrated the dangers inherent in the application of 
abrasive policy instruments, and it simultaneously exposed the limitations of Moscow’s 
influence in the region. As one analyst summarized, “Russia’s policy regarding [the] 
Abkhazian elections demonstrated how far it was willing to go in its attempts to control 
Abkhazia, and, at the same time, highlighted the real constraints on its ability to exercise 
effective influence” (Antonenko 2005, 258-9).  What is more, following the political 
crisis instigated by Moscow, Russian policy with respect to Abkhazia changed 
concerning the use of Russian soft-power resources. 
HUMBLE BEGINNINGS: THE 1994 AND 1999 ABKHAZIAN ELECTIONS 
Unlike the majority of the post-Soviet states, which adopted heavily centralized 
presidential systems of government immediately upon gaining independence—the noted 
exceptions being Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—Abkhazia began its existence in the 
early 1990s as a parliamentary republic.  Mirroring the governing system that had existed 
in Autonomous Republic during the Soviet period, Abkhazia’s head of government 
remained the chairman of the Supreme Council until 1994.  This changed on 26 
November 1994 when Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the 
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Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1990-1992 and chairman of the Supreme 
Council of the Republic of Abkhazia from 1992-1994, was named Abkhazia’s first 
president by Supreme Council vote.  According to the Abkhazian Constitution, the 
President of the Republic of Abkhazia serves a five-year term.  Concurrent with the 
republic-wide referendum on Abkhazian independence and the ratification off the 
Abkhazian Constitution of 1994, on 3 October 1999 Ardzinba was reelected for a second 
five-year term in the first popular presidential elections held in the breakaway republic.  
Ardzinba received ninety-eight percent of the vote.  There were no alternative candidates 
(Сухов 2009). 
THE 2004 ABKHAZIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: ENTER THE BEAR 
According to Oksana Antonenko’s analysis of the 2004 Abkhazian elections, 
“President Ardzinba had been a convenient leader for Moscow,” due primarily to his 
“uncompromising attitude toward Georgia” and his “long-standing ties to Moscow” 
(Antonenko 2005, 259).  For a number of years leading up to the 2004 elections, 
however, Ardzinba had been incapacitated by chronic illness, and during his 
administration, corruption flourished in the de facto state (Сухов 2009).  Accordingly, 
“despite his contributions to nation-building, Ardzinba and particularly the people around 
him had lost public support among the impoverished Abkhazian population long ago” 
and by 2004 “the people of Abkhazia were looking for a new beginning” (Antonenko 
2005, 259-60). 
Five candidates ran for president in the 2004 elections, the first round of which 
scheduled for 3 October of that year.  Raul Khadjimba, former head of the State Security 
Service, Minister of Defense from 2002-2003 and Abkhazian Prime Minister from 2003-
2004, stood as the acting government’s candidate of choice.  His opponents included 
 79 
Sukhum/i City Council member and People’s Party leader Yakub Lakoba, former Prime 
Minister (2001-2003) Anri Djergenia, Abkhazian Foreign Minister since 1997 Sergei 
Shamba and former Prime Minister (1997-1999) and director general of the 
Chernomorenergo (“Black Sea Energy”) firm Sergei Bagapsh (Сухов 2009).  By August 
2004, however, it was clear that the first round of the elections would be a showdown 
between Khadjimba and Bagapsh. 
It quickly became apparent that Moscow too had chosen Raul Khadjimba as its 
preferred candidate.  A 2004 Novaya Gazeta article commented on the impetus behind 
Russia’s choice:  
Russia for Abkhazia is what the USSR was for Cuba.  Big Brother. 
Both candidates—former PM Sergei Bagapsh and current PM Raul Khadjimba—
were set on pro-Russian, anti-Georgian political courses.  Both were integral parts 
of the Abkhazian power structure.  Russia should not have cared who won the 
election: either way, the victor would be Russia’s staunch ally. 
But Bagapsh would be a bit more self-reliant, while Khadjimba was an 
industrious yet submissive former KGB officer.  This turned out to be enough for 
Khadjimba to receive the Kremlin’s support (author’s translation Латынина 
2004). 
As Antonenko observes in her analysis of the elections, considering his career in the 
security services, Khadjimba fit the profile of an “Abkhazian Putin” quite well, and 
Moscow threw its weight behind him accordingly.  Using a meeting between WWII 
veterans as his setting, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Khadjimba behind 
closed doors in the southern Russian resort town of Sochi in late August 2004.  While 
officially discussions between the Russian President and the Abkhazian Premier centered 
on “issues of cooperation between veterans’ organizations in Russia and Abkhazia,” it 
soon became clear that this meeting represented Russia’s entry into the 2004 Abkhazian 
elections (Барахова и Новиков 2004). 
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CAMPAIGNING HARD AND SOFT 
With its candidate chosen, Moscow began its campaign, bringing both hard and 
soft power to bear on the Abkhazian electorate.  The 30 August summit of Russian and 
Abkhazian war veterans was the first move.  Held in Sochi, the summit was an 
opportunity for Putin to meet with Moscow’s man in the upcoming election as well as a 
chance for Russia to build its image as a friend to the Abkhazian people.  Quoting the 
following year’s budget, the Russian President promised a one-time 1.5 billion-ruble 
donation to veterans’ organizations in both Russia and Abkhazia as well as a 1.4 billion-
ruble contribution to the Russian Pension Fund, specifically targeted toward veterans 
(remember that by 2004 a large number of Abkhazian pensioners were already receiving 
pensions as citizens of the Russian Federation) (Барахова и Новиков 2004). As earlier 
discussed, Russian pensions represented the application of both hard and soft-power 
resources considering the inducement and humanitarian effects of monetary aid in the 
Abkhazian situation.   
In September, Moscow began to campaign for Khadjimba in a much more 
traditional manner.  Hundreds of posters with the Abkhazian Premier and the Russian 
President shaking hands and promising a bright future were plastered on buildings in 
cities across the de facto state.  One resident from the town of Gulprish sarcastically 
noted the difference in quality between the posters obviously produced by Khadjimba’s 
Kremlin benefactors and those of the opposition candidates: 
I’ve tested their quality and found that the Sergei Bagapsh posters are made of 
very thin material…The posters where Khadjimba is next to Putin are very tough, 
like tarpaulin. In summer I go to the mountains… I’ll make a good new tent out of 
these posters. Then I’ll be able to say that Mr. Putin and Raul Khadjimba are 
personally protecting me from the rain (Khashig 2004(b)). 
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Simultaneously, “Moscow used its economic power and its unique role as 
Abkhazia’s only link to the outside world to offer practical rewards” in connection with 
its support for Khadjimba’s candidacy.  In late September, violating the 2003 Sochi 
agreements between Moscow and Tbilisi,77 Moscow unilaterally reopened the rail link 
between Sochi and Sukhum/i and resumed regular bus service between the two cities, an 
obvious application of Russian hard-power inducement (Antonenko 2005, 261). 
Finally, in probably the most visual display of Moscow’s support, and most overt 
application of its hard and soft power in the 2004 elections, Russian politicians and pop 
singers were sent to Sukhum/i to rally for the Kremlin’s candidate.  Despite an agreement 
between the candidates that they would not campaign on 30 September, Abkhazian 
Independence Day,78 the visiting Russian politicians and singers openly backed 
Khadjimba during the special ceremonies commemorating the holiday, which had been 
organized by the Khadjimba campaign and were broadcast live on Abkhazian television 
(Сухов 2009).  Reportedly, during the ceremonies Vladimir Zhirinovsky announced that 
if the Abkhazian’s did not vote for Khadjimba, Russia would close its border with the 
breakaway region and declare a blockade, and singer and politician Iosif Kobzon 
declared his intention to sing at Khadjimba’s inevitable inauguration (Khashig 2004(a)).  
Another Russian singer, apparently drunk, further insulted the holiday audience by 
confusing Abkhazia with a completely different autonomous region in southwestern 
Georgia, greeting them with “hello, Adjara!” (International Crisis Group 2006). 
                                                 
77 According to the agreement signed by the Russian and Georgian presidents in March 2003, the rail link 
between Sochi and Sukhum/i would only be opened in parallel with the return to Abkhazia of Georgian 
IDPs (Antonenko 2005, 241). 
78 30 September 2004 marked the 11th anniversary of Abkhazia’s victory in its 1992-1993 war of 
succession with Georgia. 
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HUBRIS, LEGACY AND POLITICAL CRISIS 
Using economic investment, threats and shows of political support by politicians 
and cultural icons, Moscow sought to apply its hard and soft power to push its preferred 
candidate into the Abkhazian presidential seat.  These efforts, however, had the opposite 
of their intended effects. 
Abkhazian reaction to the 30 September ceremonies was resoundingly negative.  
At an extraordinary session of parliament held 1 October and attended by all the 
candidates and campaign staff, the Abkhazian Central Election Committee (CEC), the 
Prosecutor General, the acting Prime Minister, and a judge from the Supreme Council, 
the “independence day celebrations” were denounced as a flagrant violation of 
Abkhazian sovereignty (International Crisis Group 2006).  Ordinary Abkhazian citizens 
were likewise outraged at Russia’s interference in their electoral process.  One Abkhazian 
war veteran complained that “they basically turned Victory Day into Raul Khadjimba’s 
inauguration day and insulted the whole of Abkhazia,” while a demonstrator protesting 
outside of Parliament after the ceremonies summed up the “celebration” as follows: 
Basically, the Russian politicians explained to us that the presidential elections 
had taken place and Raul Khadjimba had been appointed. For all our respect for 
our neighbor, the people of Abkhazia have the right to choose their own leader 
(Khashig 2004(a)). 
Russian interference was exacerbated by Khadjimba’s reputation and position in 
the de facto government.  As mentioned earlier, impoverished and frustrated by the 
corruption that had thrived under Ardzinba, much of the Abkhazian population had 
turned against the aged and ineffectual leader by 2004.  As Antonenko explains, “for the 
public, the [2004] election was not a referendum on policy toward Russia or Georgia, but 
a chance to vote on Ardzinba’s record,” and as such, “Khadjimba’s close relationship 
with Ardzinba meant that he enjoyed little public support within Abkhazian society” 
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(Antonenko 2005, 260).  Antonenko suggests that Moscow was either unaware of this 
fact or, more likely did not care and deliberately ignored it.  Whatever the case, “instead 
of strengthening Khadjimba’s support, [Russian interference] turned many voters toward 
[Bagapsh], who was seen as a more independent politician unassociated with the negative 
legacy of Ardzinba’s regime” (Antonenko 2005, 262).79 
The elections took place as planned on 3 October and the following day, the 
Abkhazian CEC pronounced Khadjimba the winner, attributing 52.84 percent of the vote 
to him and 33.58 percent to his top opponent, Sergei Bagapsh (International Crisis Group 
2006).  These figures were reported on Russian television as well (Латынина 2004).  
Based on their own data from polling stations across the region, Bagapsh and his 
supporters protested these results and on 5 October, the CEC revised its preliminary 
count putting Bagapsh ahead of Khadjimba by 9,000 votes80 (Khashig 2004(a)).  As 
tension grew in the Abkhazian capital and across the region, supporters of each of the two 
leading candidates began holding regular protest rallies, until 11 October when the CEC 
announced that, including those cast in the Gal/i district, Bagapsh had won 43,336 of 
86,525 votes in the first round, totaling 50.08 percent and making him the winner 
(International Crisis Group 2006).81 
Unsatisfied with the results and lambasting his opponent’s victory as a fraud, 
Khadjimba brought the issue before the Abkhazian Supreme Court.   After long 
deliberation the court confirmed Bagapsh’s win on 28 October, only to reverse their 
                                                 
79 Looking back on the eve of the 2009 Abkhazian elections at the events of 2004, Ivan Sukhov comes to 
much the same conclusion: “Khadjimba, regardless of whether one supported him or not, was seen as 
Moscow’s candidate and the President Ardzinba’s ‘successor,’ whereas Bagapsh was seen as the candidate 
of change” (author’s translation Сухов 2009, 13). 
80 The 5 October results estimated a total turnout of 80,000 and—excluding votes from the Gal/i district—
attributed 38,000 and 29,000 to Bagapsh and Khadjimba respectively (Khashig 2004(a)). 
81 The CEC decision was extremely controversial, as only 11 of 15 members signed the protocol and the 
committee’s chair resigned in protest after its release (Алленова и Сысоев 2004). 
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decision the following day (Коммерсантъ 2004), after the court was sacked by 
Khadjimba’s supporters and forced to declare the election results invalid, mandating a 
rerun (Khashig 2004(c)).  Khadjimba supporters then blockaded the Abkhazian 
parliament building and, in turn, Bagapsh supporters took over the Abkhazian central 
television station (Тирмастэ 2004). On 12 November a crowd of protesters supporting 
Bagapsh temporarily seized government buildings in the capital as well as the 
presidential palace before dispersing at Bagapsh’s request (Khashig 2004(d)).  By 6 
December, inauguration day, tension had reached fever pitch in the Abkhazian capital 
and the small secessionist region seemed on the edge of civil war. 
REFUSING TO LOSE 
As Abkhazia fell into political crisis, the Russian authorities stepped up their 
interference in the de facto state.  Having failed to produce a victory for its candidate 
using economic rewards, political support, cultural appeal and even whispers of threats, 
Moscow was now determined to get the outcome it desired by using a much more 
coercive set of hard-power instruments.  Russian influence over the Abkhazian 
government was too important to lose and the Kremlin refused to admit defeat. 
On 6 October, Ardzinba removed Khadjimba from the position of Abkhazian 
Prime Minister, appointing former Sukhum/i Mayor and employee of the Russian 
Ministry of Emergency Situations Nordar Khashba to the post.  Reportedly sent by Putin 
to “stabilize the situation” in Abkhazia, Khashba was universally seen as Moscow’s 
representative during the political crisis (International Crisis Group 2006).  Asked about 
his connections to Russia, Khashba told a group of journalists on 8 October: 
Of course Russia has its own interests here, considering Russian citizens live in 
Abkhazia.  Russia simply wants the electoral process here to proceed 
normally…Russia indeed indicated its preference [that Khadjimba be elected], but 
 85 
I never heard Vladimir Vladimirovich say “elect this man” (author’s translation 
Алленова 2004(b)). 
Shortly after Khashba’s appointment, a censorship regime was implemented on 
Abkhazian state television and non-government newspapers ceased to be printed in 
Abkhazia as well as in nearby Sochi.  The official explanation given was technical 
problems at the printing shops, but editors of various independent papers reported that 
this was just an excuse.  “We’ve published our paper in Sochi for four years, but now we 
are told it won’t be printed, although the print workers have told us confidentially that the 
town leadership has given them the order” (Khashig 2004(b)). 
In early November, the Russian government issued various statements blaming 
the street demonstrations and disorder in the Abkhazian capital on Bagapsh and his 
supporters, warning that it might send troops to restore order in the secessionist region.  
On 17 November, Abkhazian Parliament Chairman and Bagapsh supporter Nugzar 
Ashuba stated that while Russian military bases and peacekeepers were welcome in 
Abkhazia for the purpose of defense, the deployment of additional troops might lead to 
violence.  “[Russian troops] can not settle the internal political situation in Abkhazia. 
Order in the republic is our internal affair. It is up to the Abkhaz people to decide who 
their president should be” (Socor 2004(a)). 
Finally, and most brazenly, Russia opted to employ economic blockade in order to 
force its will on the de facto state.  In late November Aleksandr Tkachov, Governor of 
Krasnodar Krai (a region in Russia that borders Abkhazia), called for sanctions and 
requested that the Russian-Abkhazian border be closed in response to the political 
upheaval in the breakaway region, even suggesting that Russian pensions should be cut 
off unless Bagapsh yielded to demands for a rerun of the election and a push back of the 
scheduled 6 December inauguration ceremony.  On 1 December Russia made good on its 
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threats and instituted a partial blockade, ceasing all railway traffic from Sukhum/i to 
Sochi, restricting cross-border passage for Abkhazian residents, quarantining Abkhazian 
citrus shipments and placing Russian naval forces on alert, in preparation for a complete 
blockade “if further unlawful actions by Bagapsh result in a further deterioration of the 
situation in Abkhazia” (Civil Georgia 2004; Socor 2004(b)).  Moscow defended its 
blockade with familiar propagandistic rhetoric, proclaiming a desire to “prevent the 
escalation of violence and ensure the safety of Russia's citizens,” while assuring locals 
that “these measures are not directed at the people of Abkhazia and will be lifted as soon 
as the situation stabilizes." Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s emissary Nodar Khashba, 
ostensibly defending the ordinary inhabitants of the de facto state, announced that he 
would appeal to Moscow to lift sanctions, while implying that Russian demands should 
be met (Socor 2004(b)). 
Russia also played the role of “mediator” during the crisis, calling the Abkhazian 
candidates to Moscow for consultations in early November. Initially Moscow 
uncompromisingly backed Ardzinba’s call for a rerun of the election in mid November, 
however, Bagapsh and his opposition supporters seemed equally uncompromising, 
declaring that rerun elections were not even up for discussion.  In comments after the 3 
November summit, Bagapsh challenged Moscow’s position: 
While members of the Russian Security Council and Khadjimba were acting in 
concert, I stood my ground alone…I can accept advice from Russia and I respect 
Moscow’s position, but I will not acquiesce to its pressure.  A certain someone is 
trying to threaten us by saying they will close the Russian-Abkhazian border if we 
do not agree to a rerun election.  But if they think that they can scare us with these 
threats, they are mistaken” (author’s translation Новиков и Сысоев 2004). 
Despite the boldness of Bagapsh’s statement, the reality of the Russian blockade 
in early December proved too much for the Abkhazian opposition to bear.  On 6 
December, in an agreement brokered by the Deputy Speaker of the Russian State Duma 
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and the Russian Deputy Prosecutor General, Bagapsh and Khadjimba agreed to a new 
election, to be held no later than 13 January 2005, in which the two rivals would run on a 
combined ticket with Bagapsh as president and Khadjimba as vice president.  It is telling 
that this compromise was not concurrent with Moscow’s initial demands.  Nonetheless, 
after the deal was signed by all parties, Russia agreed to lift its blockade of Abkhazia and 
in an ironic statement made during a visit to Turkey President Putin insisted, “we do not 
want the impression to be created that one decision or another was taken under pressure 
from the Russian side, because if one side feels hard done by, it will probably put the 
blame on Russia. We don’t need that” (quoted in Khashig 2004(е)).  The new elections 
were held 12 January 2005 and unsurprisingly the combined Bagapsh-Khadjimba ticket 
took 91.6 percent of the vote (Алленова 2004(a)). 
AN OVEREXTENSION OF POWER 
Moscow’s actions and Abkhazian reactions during the 2004 presidential poll are 
illustrative of two very important considerations relating to a nation’s application of its 
hard and soft-power resources.  First, though frequently praised for its ability to effect 
change “softly,” when used with jingoistic zeal that is inconsiderate of the traditions and 
aspirations of other cultures and peoples, soft power can elicit the type of impassioned 
resistance expected from the abuse of hard power.82  This effect was particularly visible 
in Abkhazian reactions to Moscow’s soft-power policies leading up to the October 
elections, especially with respect to Russian political support for Khadjimba.  As one 
commentator noted following the first round of the elections: 
                                                 
82 Oksana Antonenko summarized Russia’s influence in the elections as follows: 
“The limits to Russia’s influence are not based on geopolitics...Nor do these limits stem from a lack of 
resources.  Rather they owe to the incompetence of those who conceived and implemented Russia’s 
strategies.  These individuals lacked both an understanding of and a respect for the Abkhazian people and 
their aspirations” (Antonenko 2005, 265). 
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Fully politicized and dumbfounded by the secret meetings between Khadjimba 
and Putin, the posters depicting the two embracing and the decent of Russian pop 
stars on Sukhum/i, the Abkhazians began knocking on the doors of polling 
stations with the warning “we’re not cattle.”  This was true even of Khadjimba’s 
supporters. 
There is a simple political equation that every Abkhazian knows: “The Georgians 
are ready to butcher you, and the arrogant Russians look at your country like a 
small Russian province, where the regional committee secretary is appointed by 
Moscow” (author’s translation Латынина 2004). 
Two days after the 3 October vote, Bagapsh summed up Abkhazian resistance to 
Moscow’s manipulation as follows: 
These were the first competitive elections and the Abkhazian people wanted to 
decide by themselves about the future of [their] republic.  Therefore, the 
electorate voted against the pressure exercised from [Ardzinba’s] authorities, 
against the information blockade, and against the black [public relations] in the 
Russian press (quoted in Antonenko 2005, 260). 
Second, the 2004 elections illustrated what Joseph Nye and others have cautioned 
about the interplay of hard and soft-power resources in policy formation, namely that an 
overreliance on hard-power policy instruments can seriously harm a nation’s soft power 
by sullying its national image.  During the albeit brief Russian blockade of Abkhazia in 
December 2004, Russian media detailed the economic hardship inflicted on the 
population of the de facto state and the resentment that Moscow’s policies generated 
among a populace that sought Russian protection and citizenship.  In some cases, 
Abkhazian residents even began demonstratively burning their Russian passports, and 
one Abkhazian truck driver complained in early December, “No one has any feeling for 
us even in Russia. What sort of Russia is that?” (Socor 2004(с)).  While in the end Russia 
was able to partially manipulate the electoral outcome in the Georgian breakaway region, 
Moscow’s abrasive and unbalanced policy techniques minimized its influence over the 
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process and ensured that the Abkhazians would no longer view Russian influence in 
Abkhazia as purely innocuous. 
RUSSIAN POLICY SHIFT AND THE 2009 ABKHAZIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
In the aftermath of the 2004 Abkhazian electoral crisis, Russian policy in the 
region witnessed a categorical shift in character.  Russian engagement of Abkhazia to that 
point had relied heavily on the use of policy instruments drawing almost exclusively on 
Russian military and economic hard-power resources.  When Moscow attempted to wield 
the soft power of its political support in September 2004, its uneven and overzealous 
application of both hard-power and soft-power policy instruments had the opposite of its 
intended effect, precipitating crisis, pushing the subject of its engagement away and 
curtailing Russian influence in the region.  It would be naïve to think that Moscow did 
not see the mistakes it made during the 2004 Abkhazian elections, and since the crisis, 
Russia seems to have regulated the application of its policy instruments in Abkhazia.  
While hard-power instruments such as military presence and economic investment 
continue to represent the basis of Russian engagement in the region, Moscow has also 
actively increased the use of its soft-power resources83 and, at the same time, has 
moderated the intensity of this engagement.  A prime example of this shift can be seen in 
Russia’s involvement in the 2009 Abkhazian presidential elections. 
In his November 2009 analysis of the upcoming December 2009 elections, Ivan 
Sukhov paid special attention to the so-called “Russia factor.”  Emphasizing lessons 
learned in the 2004 Abkhazian elections, Sukhov outlined Moscow’s interest in “fully 
supporting all outward signs of Abkhazian sovereignty, specifically by not interfering in 
the [upcoming] elections” (Сухов 2009, 40).  Especially considering the close 
                                                 
83 As I showed in chapter five, most of Moscow’s language and education policies, propaganda ploys and 
cultural exchanges in Abkhazia took place during and after Putin’s second term as Russian President. 
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relationship between Moscow and Sukhum/i after August 2008, he argues, involvement 
in the Abkhazian electoral process to the level of Moscow’s meddling in 2004 was not 
necessary.   
In a June 2009 article, even while emphasizing the strength of the Abkhazian-
Russian partnership after August 2008, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba 
critiqued Russia’s role in the 2004 Abkhazian elections: 
As the previous presidential elections proved, the Abkhazian people will not 
suffer manipulation.  They cannot be controlled.  While you can show them your 
point of view, they will decide themselves who to elect (author’s translation 
Шамба 2009). 
In 2009 Moscow took this maxim to heart—if only rhetorically—instructing the Russian 
Ambassador in Abkhazia to make a statement on local television about the upcoming 
elections two days before the poll.  In the statement the Ambassador emphasized that 
Moscow had no concrete preferences in terms of candidates, simply desiring that the 
elections “take place in a calm atmosphere and adhere to all universally recognized 
democratic norms.”  Tellingly, Moscow’s representative did not miss an opportunity to 
stress cooperation between the two entities: 
Since the recognition of Apsny84 in August of last year the fate of our countries 
and peoples has become more interconnected than ever before in the centuries of 
history between us…I am sure that the Abkhazian people will choose a candidate 
that will continue a course strengthening the strategic union between Russia and 
Abkhazia, and expanding the multifaceted, mutually beneficial cooperation 
between our countries (author’s translation with emphasis added Администрация 
Президент РА 2009(c)). 
On 12 December 2009 Sergei Bagapsh was reelected President of Abkhazia, winning 
fifty-nine percent of the first-round vote (International Crisis Group 2010).  No visible 
Russian interference was registered. 
                                                 
84 Apsny is the name of the Abkhazian territory in the Abkhaz language. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
RUSSIAN POWER: REDUX 
Power can be defined as the capacity one possesses to make, receive or resist 
change.  Building on the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, in the early 1990s 
Joseph Nye Jr. conceptualized a power dichotomy, separating strategies that seek to 
coerce (hard power) and those that seek to co-opt (soft power).  In the realm of world 
politics, he argued, any actor seeking to influence the decisions made by any second 
actor—be they single nation-states, multinational institutions, alliances of nations, broad-
based political movements, non-governmental organizations or other international 
actors—will use policy instruments that project the first actor’s hard and soft power with 
respect to the second.  In so far as they operationalize specific power resources, different 
policy instruments will have differing effects when used, projecting either hard power, 
soft power or a mixture of both.  The context of their application and the interplay 
between the various instruments applied dictate whether this capacity for influence and 
change will be realized. 
As previously discussed, instruments projecting hard power in world politics are 
intended to coerce through inducement or threat and traditionally draw on so-called hard-
power resources such as military might and economic prowess.  Instruments projecting 
soft power are intended to co-opt through the setting of a political agenda, attraction and 
the (re)definition of norms and (re)formation of interests.  This second group of 
instruments traditionally draws on the so-called soft-power resources of culture, political 
values and foreign policies. 
Like most powerful state actors, the Russian federation possesses both hard power 
and soft power.  From a power resource standpoint, Russian power in international 
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politics is based in its geographical size and location; its energy resources and control of 
supply routes; its military-industrial complex; its business interests and foreign 
investment potential; its labor market; its political stability and ideology; its agenda-
setting potential through membership in international organizations; its history of 
multiculturalism; the cultural appeal of its history and fine arts; its mass-media; and the 
status of the Russian language as the lingua franca in the former Soviet region.   
Over the past two decades Russia has successfully converted these power 
resources into foreign policy instruments projecting both hard and soft power in its near 
abroad as well as in Europe and across the globe.  As previously discussed, these 
instruments have included the use of military forces, weapons trade and military training 
agreements, oil and gas trade agreements, foreign investment, the active spreading of 
Russian language and culture, the propagation of a “sovereign democracy” political 
ideology through pro-Russian NGOs and mass-media, and agenda-setting foreign policy 
decrees and resolutions. 
ANSWERING THE “ABKHAZ QUESTION” 
Russia and Abkhazia share a tumultuous history spanning more than two hundred 
years, and over the two centuries of its existence, the Russia-Abkhazia relationship has 
experienced times of great discord as well as harmony.  Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russian foreign policy in its near abroad has focused primarily on maintaining 
and expanding Moscow’s influence over, and connection to, the new independent states, 
particularly in regions of conflict such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova.  As one of 
the post-Soviet “frozen conflicts,” and a region with substantial strategic and material 
value, Abkhazia has remained a focal point of Russian foreign policy over the past two 
decades.  The purpose of Russian foreign policies with respect to the breakaway republic 
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is to solidify the bilateral connection between the two entities, and in so doing, bring 
Abkhazia securely into Moscow’s orbit. 
As I have shown, to accomplish this goal, Russia has levied both its hard and soft 
power at Abkhazia, coercing and co-opting the de facto state into a bilateral relationship 
dominated by Moscow.  From 1999-2009 the instruments that Moscow employed varied, 
at times including the presence of peacekeepers, economic aid and investment, border 
control regimes, economic sanctions, cultural exchanges, naturalization campaigns, 
shows of diplomatic support, Russian language policy and the use of ethno-political 
propaganda.  Each of these instruments represents the conversion of a unique blend of 
hard-power and soft-power resources and, as explicated in Chapter Five, each produced a 
distinctive blend of hard-power and soft-power effects on the Abkhazian government and 
population. Occasionally, the effects of these instruments were unexpected if not wholly 
unwelcome, and they hindered Moscow in accomplishing its goals almost as frequently 
as they assisted it. 
Analysis of Russia’s foreign policy instruments and their effects in Abkhazia has 
highlighted numerous examples supporting recent research addressing instances when 
traditionally defined hard-power instruments display soft-power effects, and vice versa.  
In addition, my examination of Russia’s foreign policy strategy with respect to Abkhazia 
highlights how various instruments have reinforced and contradicted each other in actual 
policy application. 
Another important finding of my study is that the interplay of hard and soft power 
among different policy instruments is frequently echoed within them.  Evidenced best by 
Russia’s “passportization” campaign in Abkhazia, individual policy instruments often 
produced both hard and soft-power effects simultaneously; coercing a subject while they 
co-opted his interests.  For Abkhazian residents, the pensions and travel rights brought by 
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Russian citizenship represented rewards for political alignment, while they 
simultaneously portrayed Russia’s ostensible defense of Abkhazian human rights.  In 
addition, as my analysis shows, the interplay of hard and soft power within a single 
policy instrument can lead to one effect undermining another.  For an example, Russia’s 
repeated promises to defend its newfound citizenry ironically diminished the soft-power 
attraction of its “passportization” as it threatened Abkhazian identity and recast Russian 
humanitarian concerns for Abkhazia as political calculations and manipulation in the 
larger Russia-Georgia and Russia-NATO relationships. 
Finally, my examination of Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia has 
underscored a potentially important trend in Russian foreign policy, namely Moscow’s 
recognition and active use of the soft-power resources at its disposal.  In Abkhazia 
between 1999-2009 this trend was visible in the establishment and increased activity of 
Kremlin-backed NGOs and organizations working to spread Russian language and 
culture, as well as in the increasingly potent political rhetoric supporting the de facto state 
following the 2004 election crisis. 
FUTURE RESEARCH: APPROACHING “EFFECTIVENESS” 
When seeking to influence the decisions of others, the “effectiveness” of one’s 
policy instruments is of vital concern.  Indeed questions about how to define and 
implement an effective foreign policy strategy were one of the driving forces behind 
those championing the hard-power/soft-power theoretical dichotomy in the early 1990s.  
Given that hard power and soft power, when wielded, affect a target in categorically 
different ways, and considering Joseph Nye’s assertions that, alone, neither is sufficient 
to achieve real success in modern world politics, identification of an effective, or as Nye 
put it, “smart” blend of hard and soft-power instruments is an essential building-block of 
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any foreign policy strategy.  Effectiveness in this context is a complicated concept, 
encompassing agent preferences, implementation methods and subject perceptions, and 
while in my study of Russian-Abkhazian relations I have identified the various hard and 
soft-power instruments applied by Russia and analyzed how these instruments were 
interpreted by their Abkhazian subjects, my research does not focus on evaluating which 
Russian policy instruments—hard or soft—have had a greater effect on Russian-
Abkhazian alignment.  Put another way, my research does not show which instrument 
blends are showing “policy success.” 
Given the importance of this line of inquiry, future research might focus on 
defining Russian “policy successes” with respect to a subject like Abkhazia—possibly 
through a set of observable instances of policy alignment and divergence—and on 
evaluating, through qualitative methods, what kinds of soft and hard-power blends can be 
credited with causing these successes.  In addition to addressing regional policy 
considerations, this research would prove valuable for state actors experimenting in 
blending hard and soft power in their own foreign policy. 
Within the Russia-Abkhazia case, the 2004 Abkhazian elections is a prime 
example of divergence between Moscow and Sukhum/i.  It was ironically Russia’s 
support of Raul Khadjimba that ensured his loss, creating a rift between the two capitals: 
At the beginning of campaign [Khadjimba] had a good chance of beating out his 
competitors.  But in the end it turned out that the interference by Russian 
campaign specialists did not increase but rather decreased these chances, eliciting 
extreme annoyance among an Abkhazian people, who, in essence, were striving 
for the first time to take advantage of their civil rights and independently and 
freely determine the future composition of their country’s leadership (author’s 
translation Сухов 2009, 12). 
As a prime example of Russian “policy failure” with respect to Abkhazia, Moscow’s 
blend of hard and soft-power policy instruments used in this instance could be compared 
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to its blends during times of “policy success,” with conclusions drawn in terms of 
instrument effectiveness.  Of course, other concerns such as issue salience among the 
Abkhazian population and government would have to be taken into consideration as well. 
Concerning the Russia-Abkhazia relationship specifically, because my research 
only examines ethnic Abkhaz interpretations of Russian policies, an investigation—
through instruments such as focus groups, surveys and interviews—of policy instrument 
interpretations by the other ethnic groups in the region85 would further clarify soft-
power/hard-power evaluations of Russian policies and therein spell out their capacities to 
influence the people of Abkhazia.  Finally, building on the contributions from this study, 
more research should be conducted into instances where traditionally hard-power 
instruments exhibit soft-power effects—such as economic aid attracting rather than 
inducing—and instances where traditionally soft-power instruments exhibit hard-power 
effects—such as the spread of one language threatening the identity of a people rather 
than co-opting them culturally. 
PARTNER AND PROTECTORATE: LOOKING AHEAD IN ABKHAZIA 
“We are not naive. We know that we cannot have a fully equal relationship with 
Russia, and neither do we need it. It is a limited form of sovereignty.”86  
One of the central issues in the period leading up to the 2009 Abkhazian elections 
was the future of Abkhazia’s relationship with its northern neighbor.  While never shying 
away from the primacy of the relationship for Abkhazia, during his first term Abkhazian 
President Sergei Bagapsh made a concerted effort to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, 
                                                 
85 According to a 2003 Abkhaz census, Armenians, Georgians, ethnic Russians and various other 
nationalities comprise fifty-six percent of the population of Abkhazia, and many experts think that the 
actual percentage may be much higher (Сухов 2009). 
86 December 2009 comments by former top Abkhazian official who quit the Government in 2009, joining 
the opposition (International Crisis Group 2010, 11). 
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reaching out, among others, to the EU, Jordan and Turkey (International Crisis Group 
2010).  Nonetheless, in the months following Russia’s August 2008 unilateral recognition 
of Abkhazia, Sukhum/i and Moscow signed a series of military, economic and political 
agreements, addressing border control, energy exploration contracts and Russian military 
base development in the region.  In early 2009, focusing on these agreements and largely 
ignoring Bagapsh’s previous multidirectional forays, opposition leaders in Abkhazia 
began leveling criticism at the Presidential Incumbent for allegedly selling out 
Abkhazia’s national interests and cleaving too close to Russia (Fischer 2009; Сухов 
2009).  This criticism was surprising considering the opposition’s own emphasis on 
strengthening Russian-Abkhazian ties.  As Ivan Sukhov noted in his analysis: 
That is the paradox of the 2009 Abkhazian elections: the incumbent Bagapsh, 
who is a proponent of a more multidirectional foreign policy, is facing 
competitors calling for deeper integration with Russia, while they criticize 
Bagapsh for emphasizing this same integration too heavily and too quickly 
(author’s translation Сухов 2009, 39). 
This pre-election rhetoric, however, was largely an issue of semantics. Despite 
political infighting, all parties and politicians in the de facto state agree on two sometimes 
contradictory principles, namely that Abkhazian independence is non-negotiable but 
increased integration with Russia is unavoidable and in many ways desirable.  Abkhazian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba’s comments in a May 2006 interview with International 
Crisis Group (ICG) summarize this position best: 
Our relations with Russia have to be very tight.  It would be without perspective 
to ignore all their resources…But we want independence, and we do not want to 
lose that.  Nobody can demand anything of us, not even Russia who wanted to 
appoint our president (quoted in International Crisis Group 2006, 8-9). 
A sober evaluation of Abkhazian-Russian relations, Shamba’s comments ring true as 
much today as in 2006, and they illustrate the effects of Russian hard and soft power on 
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the breakaway republic.  Russia is Abkhazia’s largest trading partner, primary investor 
and only security guarantor, and as such, it is in Sukhum/i’s best interest to strengthen—
or at the very least not to threaten—its relationship with Moscow.  At the same time, 
Abkhazians have not forgotten Moscow’s brazen interference in their 2004 elections and 
are still wary of being “swallowed up” by Russia.87 
Since the 2009 elections Moscow has continued to project its hard and soft power 
in Abkhazia, and political, economic, military and cultural ties between the two countries 
have grown considerably (Россотрудничество 2009(b); Gogoryan 2010; Socor 2010; 
МИД РА 2010(a); МИД РА 2010(b); Россотрудничество 2010(a); Россотрудничество 
2010(b); Gogoryan 2011; МИД РА 2011(a); МИД РА 2011(b)).  It is likely that in the 
near future these ties, as well as Russian influence in the region, will continue to expand.  
However, Moscow cannot consider its influence and dominant position in the larger 
Russia-Abkhazia relationship a foregone conclusion.  With the sudden death of Sergei 
Bagapsh in May 2011, Russia lost an increasingly staunch ally who had become a 
unifying force in the de facto state, and the emergency elections scheduled for 26 August 
2011 promise to be a defining moment for the young republic: 
The upcoming election in Abkhazia is not just about choosing a new president: 
the country has to move on to the next stage of its development…In the run-up to 
the presidential election the public is demanding sweeping reforms and 
modernization, which would allow Abkhazia to become more efficient and 
                                                 
87 The following excerpt from a summer 2008 interview with Caucasus expert Thomas De Waal outlined 
the predicament in which Abkhazia found itself concerning its relationship with Russia: 
Question: Do you think that the Abkhaz themselves have a role to play? Will there come a point where they 
resent being under Russian influence? 
De Waal: I think this has basically happened already. The Abkhaz are in a rather unenviable position. They 
have de facto seceded from Georgia and proclaimed independence which no one recognizes and which no 
one will recognize. They are also very suspicious of Russia. Like most people in the Caucasus, they see 
Russia as having a colonial role, which threatens their identity, and yet they’ve had no option but to 
embrace Russia. Russia has done many things for the Abkhaz – it has opened the border, it has paid 
pensions, it has provided investment. But the Abkhaz are being swallowed up, and there is no room for 
maneuver (De Waal 2008, 174). 
 99 
independent. The country needs “rebooting” and this includes bringing some 
order into the relations between Russia and Abkhazia. [This is] a truly difficult 
goal and it is important not to spoil relations with Moscow, but at the same time 
the country's independence must be preserved and strengthened (Khashig 2011). 
Moscow too is not naïve.  By all accounts it understands the importance of this 
juncture for Abkhazia, and as such, it understands the importance of balancing its foreign 
policy instruments with respect to the de facto state in order to prevent a crisis similar to 
the one it instigated in 2004.  Russian “smart power” in Abkhazia today is no doubt 
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